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We are nearing a tipping point in United States (U.S.) trade policy.  Populism 
from both the left and the right egged on by the rallying cry of the Brexit 
campaign in Britain, with transatlantic echoes of “Make America Great Again,” 
has played into nativist fears of openness, including fears of open economies and 
free trade.  Everyone seems to have an opinion about trade, and the prevailing 
notion is that we are playing fair while the other guys are not.  Free trade is out1 
and something called fair trade, which remains vaguely defined, is in.2  The sense 
that the U.S. is being wronged by allies and rivals alike is trumpeted everywhere.  
Trade now is associated with job loss and trade deficits, mostly caused by 
foreigners who do not play fair.  Much of the corrosive anti-trade rhetoric has 
taken on nationalist overtones and is targeted against countries such as China and 
Mexico.  The U.S. also has trade deficits with the European Union (EU)3 
 
* Betty Hutton Williams Professor of International Economic Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law, 
Chapman University; J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Political Science, Mount Holyoke College.  The author 
would like to acknowledge the generous research stipend awarded by the Dale E. Fowler School of Law. 
1 Tim Hains, Trump Focuses on Free Trade Agreements: “We’re Losing Our Shirts”, REAL CLEAR 
POLITICS (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/03/07/trumps_rust_belt_pitch_ 
when_was_the_last_time_you_saw_made_in_the_usa.html (“All this free trade, you know what, it is free 
trade for them, not for us.  We're losing our shirts.”). 
2 Meghashyam Mali, Trump Threatens to “Break” Trade Pact with Mexico, Canada, THE HILL (Sept. 
26, 2015) http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/255053-trump-vows-to-renegotiate-or-break-trade-pact-with-
mexico-canada. 
3 U.S. Census data on foreign trade with the EU show that in 2014, the U.S. ran a trade deficit of 144 
billion dollars and in 2015, a trade deficit of approximately 156 billion dollars.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
FOREIGN TRADE: TRADE IN GOODS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION (2017), https://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c0003.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2017). 
2 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 7:2 
generally and, for example, with Germany particularly,4 yet European countries 
are rarely bashed.  In fact, the U.S. trade deficit with Germany is larger than that 
with Mexico5, and yet, Germany has barely been mentioned in the anti-trade 
debate.6 
Moreover, millions of jobs have been lost because of other factors, such as 
technology and computerization—not trade.7  Job loss, due not to outsourcing but 
to automation, has been particularly heavy in the service sector, where two-thirds 
of all U.S. workers work.8  And the U.S. trade deficit, incurred when the U.S. 
imports more than it exports, is denounced in isolation, without either a broad 
understanding of how U.S. trade is linked to both national security and to 
finances—that is, the U.S. dollar and its use as an international reserve 
currency—or a deep understanding of the changes that are occurring in the nature 
of international trade itself—such as the emergence of global supply chains and 
vertical specialization.9  Trade continues to be conceptualized in old terms—
single-country or “monolocation” production.  But in reality, trade is much more 
complex, with value-added production in many countries.  Production is 
fragmented by task and involves “multilateral” processes10 using a “global factory 
model” that transcends national territory.11  This antiquated understanding of 
trade has resulted in misleading trade figures that overstate import figures and the 
relationship between imports and job loss, with countries such as China and 
Mexico. 
The discussion on trade is muddled and anachronistic as well as increasingly 
tinged with a nationalist, anti-foreign overtone that is directed only at certain 
 
4 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TOP U.S. TRADE PARTNERS (2016), http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/ 
groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf [hereinafter TOP U.S. TRADE 
PARTNERS]. 
5 In 2014, the U.S. trade deficit was $74,808 billion; in 2015, it was $74,849 billion.  The U.S. trade 
deficit with Mexico was $55,408 billion in 2014 and 60,662 billion in 2015.  Id.  
6 Yet, 
Germany is arguably a far more pressing problem than any of the countries that 
Trump likes to name-check:  The Japanese economy is a poster-child of stagnation 
and is running an aggregate trade deficit despite its reform efforts; a significant 
portion of Mexican trade supports the US industrial base; and China has actually 
started manipulating its currency to make it stronger it as it fights its own economic 
slowdown . . . . 
Tim Fernholz, Trump’s Choice of Trade Enemies Reveals the Racial Subtext of His Economic Appeal, 
QUARTZ (Mar. 15, 2016), http://qz.com/638695/theres-one-country-that-reveals-the-racism-behind-donald-
trumps-economic-rants/. 




9 David Hummels et al., Vertical Specialization and the Changing Nature of World Trade, in 4 FED. 
RES. BANK OF NEW YORK, ECON. REV. 2 at 94 (1998).  Stating: 
[G]lobalization has gone beyond just “more trade.”  The nature of trade has 
changed to the point where countries increasingly specialize in producing particular 
stages of a good, rather than making a complete good from start to finish.  This 
vertical trade is also what links heightened international trade to greater international 
production. 
Id. 
10 Made in the World, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2016), http://tinyurl.com/8ydmkfv (last visited Mar. 26, 
2017); see also Paul Krugman, The Move Towards Free Trade Zones, in 76 FED. RES. BANK OF KANSAS 
CITY, ECON. REV. 6 at 5, 15–18 (1991), http://tinyurl.com/kpn7e9e. 
11 Global Trade System, in WORLD ECON. FORUM, NETWORK GLOBAL AGENDA COUNCILS (2012), 
http://tinyurl.com/mrqrbgf.  
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countries while exempting others. There may indeed be legitimate grievances—
against many countries’ actions, including those of the U.S.—involving subsidies 
or dumping or currency manipulation—which can be resolved using trade rules.  
But the national gestalt against trade distorts debate.  For example, trade statistics 
are being used to promote an intensely nationalistic and nativist view of trade in 
which “the most important dividing line is that between American citizens and 
everyone else . . . .”12 This inaccurate and racialist view of trade has been 
compounded by rhetorical and false claims trumpeted during the 2016 
Presidential race in the U.S.  Candidates from both parties lined up to compete to 
see who is or has been most vociferously against trade agreements.  As a result, 
trade has become a (dirty) household word, reflecting deeply held national 
assumptions as well as shaping national consciousness about what trade is and 
what it should be.  Trade has become synonymous with job loss and deficits and 
for many, constitutes America’s greatest economic threat. 
This Article is not about the 2016 U.S. Presidential race, but what has come 
out of the race about trade demonstrates the extent to which anti-trade beliefs 
have entered the political mainstream.  It is true that free trade has always been 
controversial, bringing out anxieties and insecurities in the general population.  
But in recent years, ritual condemnation of trade has become a daily occurrence 
and is no longer confined to a few segments of the political spectrum.  Trade has 
become a toxic word and this distorted view of trade has become the new normal.  
Although Hillary Clinton favored the accord while she was Secretary of State, as 
a candidate for the President of the United States, she came out against President 
Obama’s Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement with eleven Pacific 
Rim nations.  Her opposition ostensibly stemmed from concerns that the trade 
agreement did not meet the “high bar” she had set, which was to create “good 
jobs, raise wages and advance . . . national security.”13 
Immediately after her denunciation of the TPP, she was herself denounced by 
both the Republican National Party and her then Democratic rival Martin 
O’Malley for “flip flopping.”  O’Malley boasted that “[he] was against the Trans 
Pacific Partnership months and months ago”14 and compared the TPP to the much 
maligned North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which he equated 
with “shuttered factories and empty pockets.”15  In a blistering attack, Trump 
called the TPP “the rape of our country.”16  Sanders went as far as to equate 
support for free trade with incompetence, proclaiming of Clinton thus, “I don’t 
think you are qualified if you’ve supported virtually every disastrous trade 
agreement, which has cost us millions of decent paying jobs”17 and has been “a 
 
12 Michael Lind, This Is What the Future of American Politics Looks Like, POLITICO (May 22, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-election-realignment-partisan-political-party-
policy-democrats-republicans-politics-213909. 
13 Hillary Clinton, Commentary, If Elected President, I’ll Level the Playing Field on Global Trade, 
Clinton Says, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.pressherald.com/2016/02/23/commen 
tary-if-elected-president-ill-level-the-playing-field-on-global-trade-clinton-says/. 
14 Russell Berman, Hillary Abandons Obama on Trade, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 7, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/hillary-clinton-abandons-obama-on-trade/409546/. 
15 Id. 
16 Nick Corasaniti et al., Donald Trump Vows to Rip Up Trade Deals and Confront China, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/us/politics/donald-trump-trade-speech.html. 
17 Daniel Gross, Why Bashing Free Trade is Paying Off for Trump and Sanders, FORTUNE (Apr. 12, 
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disaster for the American worker.”18  Sanders proclaimed categorically that trade 
agreements of the past twenty-five years have been “written by corporate 
America and big money.  They want to have an agreement that enables them to 
shut down plants.”19  Consequently, using the language of workers’ rights but 
playing on old themes of economic jingoism and nativism, Sanders has pithily 
called Clinton the “outsourcer-in-chief” and pointed as evidence her previous 
support for trade with China, Colombia, and South Korea.20  Standing in Flint, 
Michigan in March 2016, Sanders blamed the city’s decline on trade with Mexico 
and China:  “Do you know that in 1960, Detroit, Michigan, was one of the 
wealthiest cities in America? . . . But then what happened is corporate America 
said, ‘Why do I want to pay somebody in Michigan a living wage when I could 
pay slave wages in Mexico or China?’”21 
Aside from the use of incendiary words like “slave wages,” the accusation is 
also not true.  General Motors began its gradual move out of Flint in the 1940s, 
building new industrial complexes in the suburbs, and then in the 1980s, it 
departed from Flint altogether.22  General Motors’s departure from Flint was 
denounced in Michael Moore’s film “Roger & Me” in 1989—four years before 
NAFTA and long before China became an export powerhouse.23 
On the Republican side, departing from long-held Republican principles 
favoring free trade, Donald Trump too has condemned Mexico, China, and poor 
countries for ripping us off and he has thus threatened to withdraw the U.S. from 
NAFTA.24  In his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention in 
2016, he declared, “I have a different vision for our workers.  It begins with a 
new, fair trade policy that protects our jobs and stands up to countries that 
cheat.”25 
Like Sanders, Trump too sees trade agreements as “a disaster.”26  But Trump 
goes even further, calling these agreements fraudulent.  “Every agreement has to 
be fair.  Every agreement has a defraud claim.  We’re being defrauded by all 
these countries.”27  As a result, “[w]e’re losing 500 billion dollars a year to China.  
We’re losing billions and billions to Japan and Vietnam and India and Mexico is 
 
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/12/free-trade-trump-sanders/ (emphasis added).  
18 Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren and I Will Help Lead the Effort to Stop TPP, REAL CLEAR 
POLITICS (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/10/07/bernie_sanders_elizabeth_ 
warren_and_i_will_help_lead_the_effort_to_stop_tpp.html. 
19 Eric Bradner, The Clinton-Sanders Trade War, CNN, (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/ 
05/politics/clinton-sanders-trade-michigan/. 
20 Id. 
21 Steve Chapman, Bernie Sanders’ Free Trade Mythology, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Mar. 10, 2016), 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/03/10/bernie_sanders_free_trade_mythology_129928.html.  
22 Josh Hakala, Flint’s Struggles Began with GM’s Move to Suburbs in 1940s, Historian Says, 
MICHIGAN RADIO (Feb. 8, 2016), http://michiganradio.org/post/flints-struggles-began-gms-move-suburbs-
1940s-historian-says#stream/0. 
23 Chapman, supra note 21; see also Danielle Kurtzleben, Fact-Check: Bernie Sanders, Abandoned 
Buildings and NAFTA, NPR (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/06/469234776/fact-check-bernie-
sanders-abandoned-buildings-and-nafta. 
24 Referring to NAFTA, Trump said, “We will either renegotiate it or we will break it because you 
know every agreement has an end.”  Mali, supra note 2. 
25 Donald Trump, Speech at Republican National Convention (July 21, 2016), in POLITICO, July 21, 
2016, http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-
at-rnc-225974. 
26 Mali, supra note 2. 
27 Id. 
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beating us both at the border and they’re beating us in trade.”28  Mexican leaders 
are characterized as more “cunning.”29 
Interestingly, other countries in Europe that the U.S. has a larger trade deficit 
with are rarely denounced or even mentioned by Trump or any mainstream 
Presidential candidate.  For example, the U.S. ran a larger trade deficit with 
Ireland in both 2014 and 2015 than it did with India.30  It also had a larger trade 
deficit with Italy than with India.31  The U.S. trade deficit was larger with Ireland 
than with Vietnam in 2014, although the U.S. trade deficit with both countries 
was essentially comparable in 2015.32  The moral urgency to protect American 
workers from job loss apparently peaks only when jobs are lost to non-European 
countries.  This fact has not attracted much mainstream commentary, except in a 
few media outlets.  For example, the following observation was made about the 
racial subtext in Sanders’ anti-trade campaign: 
 
Bernie worries a great deal about trade with brown people—
Asians, Latin Americans—but has never, so far as public records 
show, made so much as a peep about our very large trade deficit 
with Sweden, which as a share of bilateral trade volume is not 
much different from our trade deficit with China, or about the 
size of our trade deficit with Canada, our largest trading partner.  
Sanders doesn’t rail about the Canadians and Germans stealing 
our jobs—his ire is reserved almost exclusively for the Chinese 
and the Latin Americans.33 
 
Trump and Sanders thus represent the yin and yang of nationalist discontent, with 
corresponding anti-trade stances that consist of one part nationalism, one part 
nativism, and one part racialism. 
In an editorial, Hillary Clinton too has chastised but a handful of countries—
“China, Japan and other Asian economies”—as she put it, for their artificially 
cheap exports via currency manipulation.34  There may indeed be legitimate 
reasons to be concerned about currency wars or currency manipulation and in 
particular the dysfunctional relationship between China and the United States in 
this arena, as I have noted.35  But when trade is demonized and accusations of 
 
28 Donald J. Trump For President, Trade War, YouTube (Mar. 6, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=adeKc6dbsI0. 
29 Daniel Bates & Kieran Corcoran, Trump Takes Incendiary Immigration Views to the GOP Faithful: 
Tycoon Says He’d Fine ‘Cunning’ Mexico $100,000 for Every Illegal Immigrant Who Crosses Border in 
Order to ‘Take Back Our Country’, DAILY MAIL (July 21, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
3157729/Trump-takes-incendiary-immigration-views-GOP-faithful-Tycoon-tells-thousands-U-S-
outsmarted-cunning-Mexico.html. 
30 The trade deficit with India was $24 billion in 2014 versus $26 billion with Ireland.  In 2015, the 
trade deficit with India was $23 billion versus 3$0 billion with Ireland.  TOP U.S. TRADE PARTNERS, supra 
note 4. 
31 The U.S. deficit with Italy was $25 billion in 2014 versus $24 billion with India.  In 2015, the 
deficit with Italy was $30 billion versus $23 billion with India.  Id.  
32 In 2014, the deficit with Vietnam was about $25 billion versus $26 billion with Ireland.  In 2015, 
the deficit with Vietnam was $30.932 billion versus $30.405 billion with Ireland.  Id.  
33 Kevin D. Williamson, Bernie’s Strange Brew of Nationalism and Socialism, NAT’L REV. (July 20, 
2015),  http://www.nationalreview.com/article/421369/. 
34 Clinton, supra note 13. 
35 Lan Cao, Currency Wars and the Erosion of Dollar Hegemony, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 101 
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fraud and cheating are unleashed, public officials tend to target countries that are 
easy to bash—either poorer developing countries with few comparative advantage 
or countries that are sufficiently different to and thus deemed “other,” such as 
Japan and China; or workers in poor countries who can be dismissively 
characterized as “desperate and low-wage labor around the world.”36 
When it comes to trade with the global, non-white poor, charged language 
tinged with prejudice and designed to provoke anxiety and anger is used:  
“cunning”37 foreigners and their leaders “killing us on trade”38 or “ripping us 
off”39 and stealing our jobs40 while “laughing at us”41 even as we are being 
“absolutely crushed”42 and “taken to the cleaners.”43  The trope that Mexicans, for 
example, are stealing our jobs has been around for years in the immigration 
debate and it is not hard to tap into this when the debate shifts to trade.44  
Accusations that apparently resonate with a significant segment of the American 
public are lobbed about recklessly.  Mexico is equated with drugs and disease and 
then in the same speech accused of “killing us at the border . . . [and] killing us on 
trade.”45  The anti-trade debate in the U.S. is increasingly founded on “[t]he 
incessant reliance on xenophobic (and largely untrue) tropes holding that the 
current economic woes of the United States are the result of scheming foreigners, 
especially the wicked Chinese, ‘stealing our jobs’”46 or that “economic 
interactions with foreigners are inherently hurtful and exploitative . . . .”47  
Trump’s denunciations of China included the claim that “[t]hey want our people 
to starve.  They’re taking our business away.  They’ve taken our jobs away.”48 
 
(forthcoming 2017). 
36 Bernie Sanders on Trade, FEELTHEBERN.ORG (2017), http://feelthebern.org/bernie-sanders-on-
trade/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2017). 
37 Bates, supra note 29. 
38 Dan Primack, Is Donald Trump Right that Mexico Is “Killing Us” On Trade?, FORTUNE, (Aug. 10, 
2015,) http://fortune.com/2015/08/10/is-donald-trump-right-that-mexico-is-killing-us-on-trade/. 
39 Donald Trump, Presidential Announcement Speech (June 16, 2015), in TIME, June 16, 2015, 
http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/. 
40 Trump said, “[W]e’re being ripped off with China, ripped off with Japan, ripped off with Mexico at 
the border and then trade, ripped off by Vietnam, and by India, and by every country.”  India Is Taking Our 
Jobs: Not Going to Happen Anymore, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Feb. 28, 2016), http://indianexpress. 
com/article/world/world-news/us-presidential-election-donald-trump-again-blames-india-for-taking-away-
american-jobs/; Andrew Walker, US Election 2016: Are Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders Right About 
Trade?, BBC (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35981784; Jason Abbruzzese, What Do 
Bernie Sanders and Trump Have in Common? This Message, MASHABLE (Mar. 20, 2016), 
http://mashable.com/2016/03/20/jobs-inequality-donald-trump-bernie-sanders/#rxwnKyXEdaqr. 
41 Mark J. Perry, Trump Is Completely Wrong About the U.S. Trade Deficit, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0316-perry-trade-benefits-20160316-story.html.  
42 Id. 
43 Donald Trump on Free Trade, ON THE ISSUES (Nov. 6, 2016), http://www.ontheissues.org/2016/ 
Donald_Trump_Free_Trade.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2017). 
44 “The trope that Mexicans were ‘stealing American jobs’ was commonplace among some blue-
collar workers, and it offered a frame that conflated both capital flight and immigration into one convenient 
and loaded piece of moral shorthand.” Fran Ansley, Inclusive Boundaries and Other (Im)Possible Paths 
Toward Community Development in a Global World, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 396 (2001). 
45 Hunter Walker, Donald Trump Just Released an Epic Statement Raging Against Mexican 
Immigrants and “Disease”, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 6, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/donald-
trumps-epic-statement-on-mexico-2015-7.  Trump sees trade with Mexico as even more problematic than 
illegal immigration from Mexico:  “I believe that my examples of bad trade deals for the United States was 
[sic] even more concern[ing] to the Mexican government than my talk of border security.”  Id. 
46 Williamson, supra note 33. 
47 Id. 
48 Daniel Roberts, Here’s Why Donald Trump Is Giving Up Oreo Cookies, FORTUNE (Aug. 26, 2015), 
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By contrast, again, trade with a European country is viewed through different 
lens.  Indeed, a country such as Germany could also be deemed a currency 
manipulator, but it has not been the object of U.S. wrath or derision.  As some 
economists have observed, “Germany is, in many ways, the China of the 
eurozone.”49  By ensuring that real wages and prices increase more slowly in 
Germany than in other countries in Europe, “in the context of a fixed exchange 
rate within the EU, Germany effectively devalued within the eurozone and 
became much more competitive than its neighbors,”50 allowing it to grow its trade 
surplus with Europe and the rest of the world.  Critics have also noted that 
Germany relies on state subsidies and supply-side policies aimed at boosting its 
manufacturing sector.51  Even Ben Bernanke, the former chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, has acknowledged that 
 
in recent years China has been working to reduce its dependence 
on exports and its trade surplus has declined accordingly.  The 
distinction of having the largest trade surplus, both in absolute 
terms and relative to [Gross Domestic Policy], is shifting to 
Germany.  In 2014, Germany’s trade surplus was about $250 
billion (in dollar terms), or almost 7 percent of the country’s 
GDP.52 
 
And, according to Bernanke, German policies have the effect of “reducing output 
and employment outside Germany. . . .”53 
What underlies the current trade controversy in the U.S. is the belief that 
jobs, particularly manufacturing ones, should not be allowed to leave the U.S. and 
that if they do, trade is bad generally and, additionally, particularly bad if shifted 
to apparently undeserving countries like Mexico, China, and India.  The 
controversy is not just about job loss.  More and more, anti-trade critics leverage 
job loss to invoke nationalist pride and provoke with nationalist language.54  The 
nationalist reaction against trade generally and trade with non-Western countries 
particularly is partly founded on the fear that the U.S. is losing economically to 
foreigners not like Americans and that American jobs are being outsourced to 
them.  Anti-trade critics have succeeded in constructing a frame in which plant 
 
http://fortune.com/2015/08/26/donald-trump-oreos/. 
49 Robert E. Scott, Exchange Rate Policies, Not High Wages, Are Why U.S. Lags China and Germany 




52 Ben S. Bernanke, Germany’s Trade Surplus Is A Problem, BROOKINGS (Apr. 3, 2015), 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/ben-bernanke/posts/2015/04/03-germany-trade-surplus-problem. 
53 Id. 
54 Daniel Bier, Bernie Sanders’ Anti-Foreign Crankery, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC., (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://fee.org/articles/bernie-sanders-anti-trade-crankery/ (“The resentment stoked by nationalists like 
Trump and Sanders is based on a nonsensical proposition, a mirage of high-paying blue collar jobs stolen 
by conniving foreigners . . .”); see also Corasaniti, supra note 16; Tom Hall, The Economic Nationalism of 
Bernie Sanders, WORLD SOCIALIST WEBSITE (July 1, 2015), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/ 
07/01/sand-j01.html (describing Sanders’ anti-trade agenda as reactionary and nationalist, not socialist or 
internationalist because Sanders “opposes the international unity of the working class, calling instead for 
American workers to rally in defense of ‘their’ national state against foreign capital”). 
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closings are deemed to be the result of social injustice—as viewed by populists on 
the left like Sanders—or the result of fraud and unfairness—as viewed by those 
on the right like Trump.  As William Gamson observed about the effectiveness of 
what he called “collective action frame,” three elements are needed:  (1) injustice 
(framing the situation—in this case, trade—as unfair or unjust); (2) identity 
(creating an “us” versus a “them”—as in they, be it the global poor or illegal 
immigrants, are stealing our jobs or have cheated us); and (3) agency (“we” have 
the capacity and agency to change the unjust situation).55 
Trade is currently viewed through this small, prejudiced lens and focuses 
only on jobs and job loss.  The incendiary language used to attack trade by both 
mainstream Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. shows that, where trade is 
concerned, the old divisions between right and left have blurred and both are now 
united under an umbrella of economic nationalism and nativism.56  But as this 
Article demonstrates, “most jobs cut in the U.S. and Europe weren’t moved.  No 
one got them.  They vanished.  And the villain in this story—a clever software 
engineer working in Silicon Valley or the high-tech hub around Heidelberg, 
Germany—isn’t so easy to hate.”57 
In the U.S., more than 1.1 million secretarial jobs disappeared from the job 
market between 2000 and 2010 because new software made it easy for bosses to 
field their own calls and arrange their own meetings; according to the Labor 
Department, over the same period, the number of telephone operators declined by 
64 percent, word processors and typists by 63 percent, travel agents by 46 percent 
and bookkeepers by 26 percent.58  Take the example of Pacific Gas & Electric 
Company in California, which plans to replace twelve hundred old-fashioned 
meters every day with digital ones capable of gathering information without 
human workers—many making $67,000 a year—generating accurate power bills 
and sending alerts to customers when the power goes out.  Its meter-reading 
department had fifty full-time meter readers in 2007.  As of 2013, it had six.59 
The emergence of what computer scientists call “Big Data” has made 
computers indispensable for many tasks that involve the sifting, organizing, and 
processing of data.  The explosion of digital data, via sensors and bar codes, has 
resulted in the transformation of the American work place.  Every second, more 
information is exchanged on the internet than what was stored on the entire 
internet twenty years ago.60  Every hour, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. collects the 
equivalent of fifty million filing cabinets’ worth of information from transactions 
with its customers.61  Companies from Walmart to Google to Amazon have at 
 
55 WILLIAM A. GAMSON, TALKING POLITICS 6–8 (1992). 
56 Tim Rutten, Nationalism and Nativism Not Populism Fuel the Trump and Brexit Insurgencies, TIM 
RUTTEN BLOG (July 5, 2016), http://www.tim-rutten.com/nationalism-and-nativism-not-populism-fuel-the-
trump-and-brexit-insurgencies/; Jeffrey Tucker, Donald Trump’s Economic Nationalism Is Just Another 
Form of Socialism, THE STREAM (July 15, 2016), https://stream.org/donald-trumps-economic-nationalism-
just-another-form-socialism/. 
57 Condon & Wiseman, supra note 7, at 8. 
58 Paul Wiseman et al., Practically Human: Can Smart Machines Do Your Job?, YAHOO NEWS (Jan. 
25, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/practically-human-smart-machines-job-052642993--finance.html. 
59 Id. 
60 Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data, The Management Revolution, HARVARD BUS. 
REV. (Oct. 2012). 
61 Wiseman et al., supra note 58. 
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their disposal an enormous amount of raw data that they can use not only to digest 
information about their customers’ habits, but also to figure out how to automate 
tasks that humans now do, which in turn further accelerates automation and 
human job loss to machines.62  Moreover, although automation in the past tended 
to affect specific industries, today, computers are “‘general-purpose technologies’ 
used by all kinds of companies”63 and thus can be more disruptive across the 
board. 
Of course technology also creates new jobs, but not enough to make up for 
the loss of jobs it destroyed or phased out.64  In the past, the destruction of the 
horse and buggy trade also created the auto industry.  But the astounding power 
and reach of computers have led economists to rethink the economic benefits of 
technology.  Automation has not just affected manufacturing jobs requiring 
“brawn.”  It has also eliminated high-value, service jobs requiring “brains”—in 
fact, any job that involves routines regardless of skill level, resulting in the 
hollowing out of “the very jobs that support a middle-class, consumer 
economy.”65  Jobs safe from machines are “abstract tasks that require problem-
solving, intuition, persuasion and creativity.  These tasks are characteristic of 
professional, managerial, technical, and creative occupations, like law, medicine, 
science, engineering, advertising, and design.  People in these jobs typically have 
high levels of education and analytical capability . . . .”66  Computerization and 
automation have resulted in socioeconomic polarization, with job growth at the 
high end and low end and stagnation for a significant number of workers in the 
middle.  “This bifurcation of job opportunities has contributed to the historic rise 
in income inequality.”67 
And yet, despite the fact computerization and digitalization are responsible 
for a significant amount of job loss and unemployment, it is job loss due to trade 
that has been trumpeted.  In fact, as of 2016, the word automation has been 
mentioned but once during a U.S. Presidential debate, by Senator Marco Rubio.68 
It is clear then, that it is not job loss per se that is being decried but rather 
only job loss due to trade and particularly, job loss due to trade with non-white, 
poor countries.  Bernie Sanders denounced General Electric for “[s]ending jobs to 
low wage countries”69 and like Trump, singled out Mexico and China as well as 
other poor countries as those the U.S. should not trade with.  According to 
Sanders, American workers should not compete against workers in poor countries 
unless those countries “have standards.  And what fair trade means to say that it is 
 
62 Id. 
63 Bernard Condon & Paul Wiseman, Will Smart Machines Create a World Without Work?, YAHOO 
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/smart-machines-create-world-without-051025381--
finance.html. 
64 Wiseman et al., supra note 58. 
65 Condon & Wiseman, supra note 63.  
66 David H. Auteur & David Dorn, How Technology Wrecks the Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 
2013), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/how-technology-wrecks-the-middle-class/?_r=0. 
67 Id. 
68 Brenda Walker, Presidential Candidates: Why Is Automation’s Job Destruction Not Being 
Debated?, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 50 (2016), http://www.thesocialcontract.com/pdf/twentysix-two/tsc_26_ 
2_walker_3.pdf. 
69 Bernie Sanders, Interview with the Daily News Editorial Board (Apr. 1, 2016), in DAILY NEWS, 
Apr. 4, 2016, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/transcript-bernie-sanders-meets-news-editorial-board-
article-1.2588306 [hereinafter Sanders Daily News Interview]. 
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fair [sic]. It is roughly equivalent to the wages and environmental standards in the 
United States.”70  Economic nationalism from the left in this case would mean the 
only acceptable trade is trade with the Western European world. 
On the other hand, technological change is often viewed as a sign of progress 
because technology has, in many ways, made life easier for many people.  
Because it is scientifically driven, it is also seen as neutral and well, scientific, 
and inexorable.  It is difficult to demonize technology but easy to demonize poor 
countries and blame them for economic ills in the U.S.  “It doesn’t have political 
appeal to say the reason we have a problem is we’re so successful in technology,” 
said Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist.71  “There’s no enemy 
there.”72 
Relatedly, viewed through a nationalist lens then, job loss is often wrongly 
equated with the U.S. trade deficit.  Opposition to international trade stems from 
the claim that the United States imports too much and exports too little—hence 
the trade deficit.  Yet, despite the term “trade deficit,” the trade deficit has more 
to do with savings and investment than trade,73 as I discuss in Part I.  Moreover, 
even if one worries about the trade deficit, the procedure for how imports and 
exports are currently recorded is misleading, revealing a flawed picture of the 
trade deficit itself.  Because so much opposition to trade is based on the visceral 
belief that trade causes job loss in the U.S.—that is, job loss is caused when 
imports exceed exports—this Article will focus on trade, the trade deficit, and 
jobs. 
The myopic lens through which trade has been viewed has led to a truncated 
picture of trade and has severed it from other interrelated and equally important 
parts.  Before a new public consensus is formed and takes hold, this Article aims 
to inject a bit of sense and sensibility into the issue of trade and job loss, using 
micro and macro perspectives.  It makes two main arguments.  One, there is not 
enough “zooming in” of trade to allow a deep understanding of the changing 
nature of trade itself—fragmentation of production or vertical integration and 
how this has affected our understanding of the relationship between imports and 
exports on the one hand and job loss on the other.  Two, there is not enough 
“zooming out” of trade to appreciate the relationship between trade and related 
areas, such as trade and national security and trade and finances. 
With respect to the first point, Part I begins with an examination of job loss in 
the U.S. and shows that blaming trade exclusively for job loss is wrong.  It is also 
wrong to assume that when imports exceed exports, the resulting trade deficit is 
responsible for increased unemployment.  The facts solidly demonstrate that there 
 
70 Id.; see also Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade: Old and New Challenges, 104 ECON. J. 231, 239 
(1994) (arguing that “even though a trade economist would normally consider diversity among trading 
nations to be good, rather than bad, for mutually gainful trade,” protectionist arguments under the guise of 
fair trade has increased because “protectionist demands are more likely to meet with approval if, instead of 
saying that you need help because you cannot compete, you claim that the foreigner is gaining because of 
his resort to unfair trade”).  
71 Condon & Wiseman, supra note 7. 
72 Id. 
73 “A nation's trade deficit is determined by the flow of investment funds into or out of the country. 
And those flows are determined by how much the people of a nation save and invest—two variables that 
are only marginally affected by trade policy.”  David T. Griswold, America’s Maligned and Misunderstood 
Trade Deficit, CATO INSTITUTE (Apr. 20, 1998), http://www.cato.org/pubs/trade/tpa-002.html. 
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is no correlation between a rise in the trade deficit and unemployment.  In fact, 
the correlation is actually negative.  A strong economy usually results in a rise in 
imports; conversely a weak economy and high unemployment usually mean 
fewer imports.74  In addition, when the U.S. imports goods and services from 
foreign countries and pays for them in dollars, those dollars are eventually used to 
purchase U.S. goods that are exported to those countries or U.S. assets in the form 
of foreign investment in the U.S., both of which in turn create new jobs in the 
U.S.  In this way, the trade deficit is an issue of balance-of-payments accounting 
which, as explained below, balances out in the end because the dollars Americans 
spend on imported goods—which contributes to the trade deficit—actually end up 
in the U.S. again when “foreign countries returned to the United States by 
purchasing assets here.”75 
Part I also looks at the changing nature of trade in the age of globalization to 
show that our traditional understanding of import and export is anachronistic.  
This anachronism has resulted in “[m]isguided perceptions of competitiveness 
based on gross trade statistics”76 and can create the false impression that the U.S. 
imports more than it actually does, which in part foments even greater anxieties 
about the relationship between the trade deficit and job loss.  International trade 
statistics can be misleading because they measure the physical flows of goods and 
fail to capture the value added in the global production process. 
Trade has always been about specialization.  Countries specialize in 
producing goods that they have a comparative advantage in and trade with other 
countries that also specialize in accordance with their comparative advantage.  
But “[t]he traditional notion of specialization is horizontal—firms or countries 
become adept at producing particular goods and services from scratch and then 
export them.”77  Today, much of trade is done via vertical specialization or 
vertical integration78 using global supply chains.  Data show that from as early as 
2013, eighty percent of world trade, exports as well as imports, was conducted via 
global supply chains.79  
Trade now more than ever reflects 
 
[t]he increasing interconnectedness of production processes in a 
vertical trading chain that stretches across many countries, with 
each country specializing in particular stages of a good’s 
production sequence.  This phenomenon . . . has also been 
labeled quite extensively:  “slicing up the value chain”, 
“outsourcing”, “disintegration of production”, “fragmentation”, 
“multi-stage production”, and “intra-product specialization.”80 
 
74 See infra notes 254–58 and accompanying text. 
75 DOUGLAS IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 158–59 (4th ed. 2015). 
76 LAUREN DAI, THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS: HOW GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 
CHANGE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 5 (2013). 
77 Hummels et al. supra note 9. 
78 “A country’s participation in vertical specialization may be defined as:  (1) the use of imported 
intermediate inputs in the production of exports; and (2) the export of intermediate goods used as inputs by 
another country to produce goods for exports.”  DAI, supra note 76, at 14–15.  
79 Theodore H. Moran & Lindsay Oldenski, How Offshoring and Global Supply Chains Enhance the 
US Economy, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 1–2 (2016). 
80 David Hummels et al., The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade, 54 J. 
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For example, the prevalence of global supply chains means that as inputs or 
components (that together make up a final product) make their way through these 
connected chains, they cross national border not one but many times, obscuring 
“the complex role of frictions in shaping trade when supply chains span multiple 
borders.”81  In other words, imported component parts are frequently used to 
produce goods in a country that are later exported.  Today, trade is often about 
“trade in tasks” rather than “trade in goods” because trade “often occurs within 
products, where for a single product, the US specializes in design, Korea 
specializes in intermediate components, and China specializes in assembly, for 
example.”82 
Take the convoluted and complex trade history of a product described here: 
 
National Semiconductor manufactures wafers at three 
fabrication plants, or “fabs”:  South Portland (Maine), Arlington 
(Texas), and Greenock (Scotland).  Wafers are then shipped to 
the company’s assembly and packaging houses at Melaka 
(Malaysia) and Suzhou (China) where they are subjected to final 
testing and from where they are shipped directly to the 
production lines of customers worldwide. . . . For a particular 
project we could have a marketing engineer in Germany and 
design engineer in Korea, a layout engineer from Santa Clara, a 
production engineer based in Longmont (Colorado), and test 
engineers in Melaka and Santa Clara.83 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) thus has correctly observed that “[t]oday, 
companies divide their operations across the world, from the design of the 
product and manufacturing of components to assembly and marketing, creating 
international production chains.  More and more products are ‘Made in the 
World’ rather than ‘Made in the UK’ or ‘Made in France.’”84   
Although the U.S. trade deficit is real, trade statistics should be scrutinized in 
light of changes in the very nature of trade and production.  Any time a product or 
a component crosses a national border, it is recorded as an export or an import.  
But given the rise of global supply chains, it is now common for components to 
be shipped across borders at different stages of production.  Components may be 
shipped out of the U.S. to another country where processing or assembly work is 
performed and then shipped back into the U.S. for additional work before sale or 
export from the U.S.  The processed or assembled product that is shipped back 
into the U.S. will still be recorded as an import—and as evidence, for some, that 
the U.S. is losing on trade.  For example, given the prevalence of trade in 
automobiles between the U.S. and Canada, a significant part of the value of the 
 
INT’L ECON. 75, 76 (2001). 
81 Robert C. Johnson & Guillermo Noguera, A Portrait of Trade in Value Added Over Four Decades, 
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 3 (Jan. 2014).  
82 DAI, supra note 76, at 7. 
83 Jyrki Ali-Yrkko ̈ et al., Who Captures Value in Global Supply Chains, Case Nokia N95 Smartphone 
14 n.12 (Elinkeinoelämän Tutkimuslaitos [Research Institute of the Finnish Econ.], Working Paper No. 
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84 See Made in the World, supra note 10. 
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U.S. imports is actually the value of U.S. exports of American-made goods 
shipped abroad for minor processing and assembly work before being shipped 
back into the U.S. for sale or export.85 
The iconic Apple iPhone is made everywhere and thus nowhere in particular.  
Therefore, U.S. import statistics as to the true origin of the product are 
misleading.  The design, development, and marketing—as well as the software 
creation—are done by Apple itself in the U.S.  But the parts that make up the 
iPhone 6 are made all over the world.  Take some of the more major parts as an 
example:  the display comes from Japan; mixed-signal chips from the 
Netherlands; flash memory from both Japan and Korea (via Samsung); touch ID 
sensor from Taiwan; batteries from South Korea and China; chipsets and 
processors from South Korea, Taiwan, and the U.S.; accelerometer from 
Germany and the U.S.; and the transmitter and amplification modules, 
semiconductors, Facetime camera chip, display screen and glass from the U.S.  
These parts are finally assembled by Foxconn, a Taiwanese company, at its plant 
located in Shenzhen, China.86 
U.S. imports of iPhones from China—because China is the final assembly 
site—at a unit cost of $179 in 2009, added $1.9 billion to the U.S. trade deficit 
with China for the year, although the assembly cost by Foxconn in China 
constituted only $6.50 per unit and about 3.6 percent of the total manufacturing 
cost.87  The U.S. credits all of the $179 dollars to China, distorting China’s export 
value and the trade deficit imbalance with China.  If one were to disaggregate 
each value of each production process along the global supply chain, one would 
see that of the two billion dollar iPhone export from China, “96.4% is actually the 
transfer from Germany ($326 million), Japan ($670 million), Korea ($259 
million), the U.S. ($108 million) and others ($ 542 million).  All of these 
countries are involved in the iPhone production chain.”88 
That the U.S. runs a trade deficit generally and with China particularly is 
without doubt.  But facts matter and conventional trade statistics are obsolete in a 
world where production is characterized by fragmentation and cross-country 
movement of parts and components.  In the iPhone example, these figures 
exaggerate China’s export volume as well as the U.S.-China trade imbalance.  
Such distortions facilitate the demonization of trade and trade with China and 
 
85 IRWIN, supra note 75, at 18.  Indeed, given the prevalence of international production networks, 
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paint a gloom-and-doom picture of supposed U.S. economic decline that is more 
fiction than fact.  Other examples discussed below show that even in 
manufacturing, the U.S. maintains a comparative advantage in the upstream 
segment of globalized production. 
In addition to the need to zoom in and see how the nature of trade itself has 
changed and the consequences of this change on how one understands the trade 
deficit and job loss, it is also important to zoom out and see trade as part of an 
international architecture that has maintained, for the most part, stability and 
prosperity post-World War II.  The preoccupation with trade, as if it were a 
standalone story, has severed it from other interrelated and equally important 
parts.  Part II shows that trade must be viewed in a broader international order, as 
one pillar in multi-pillar world with multi-pillar parts, each related to and 
converging with the other.  Part II looks at the relationship between trade and 
national security on the one hand and trade and finances on the other.  
For the post-WWII planners, trade was deemed an important national security 
issue.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were 
firm believers in the Wilsonian doctrine that free trade promoted peace and 
security.  As Hull said, “When goods don’t cross borders, armies will.”89  High 
tariffs, competitive currency devaluations, and discriminatory trading blocs 
adopted to combat the Great Depression had exacerbated the world’s economic 
problems, leading post-war leaders to favor economic cooperation through trade 
as a way to promote both peace and prosperity.  Germany and Japan became 
American allies after World War II, constituting markets for U.S. exports and 
conversely, exporting their goods to American markets and accumulating 
American dollars in the process, cementing the dollar’s rise and its status as a 
reserve currency. 
After September 11, 2001, the National Security Strategy of the U.S., issued 
by the White House, specifically designated trade as a vital part of national 
security: 
 
A strong world economy enhances our national security by 
advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world.  
Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets 
creates new jobs and higher incomes.  It allows people to lift 
their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and 
the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of 
liberty.90 
 
In addition, the report noted the connection between trade and development on 
the one hand—trade as an effective mechanism for lifting the poor towards 
greater development—and, conversely, the relationship between development and 
security on the other hand.  “A world where some live in comfort and plenty, 
while half of the human race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor 
 
89 John Moser, Sanders and Trump Are Dead Wrong on Free Trade, THE NAT’L INTEREST (Mar. 29, 
2016), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/sanders-trump-are-dead-wrong-free-trade-15614. 
90 WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (Sept. 17, 
2002), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 
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stable.”91 
This national security strategy, which has continuously highlighted the 
linkage between trade and national security, and particularly the fight against 
terrorism, has been reaffirmed by President Obama.  President Obama’s 2015 
National Security Strategy emphasized non-military forms of power, based 
largely on “free markets, democracy, and human rights.”92  An economically 
stable, prosperous and free world is better for the U.S.  “The United States is safer 
and stronger when fewer people face destitution, when our trading partners are 
flourishing, and when societies are freer.”93  The report committed the U.S. “to 
reinforce the core architecture of the international financial and economic system, 
including the WTO, to ensure it is positioned to foster both stability and 
growth.”94  
Trade should also be understood against a broader international economic 
framework.  International trade rules are rooted in the post-World War II 
economic universe established under the leadership of the U.S.  At the insistence 
of the U.S., the international financial system was engineered around the U.S. 
dollar and its status as a world reserve currency, with the dollar convertible to 
gold upon demand.  That the dollar is the top international currency has given the 
U.S. enormous benefits.  Dollar supremacy means the world operates on a dollar-
based international economic system, which in turn affects trade, as the Article 
demonstrates in Part II.  When countries export, they receive dollars.  The more 
countries export, the more dollars are used, further cementing the dollar’s unique 
status, all to the benefit of U.S. economic and political supremacy. 
Dollar hegemony has bestowed incredible privileges on the U.S.  Most of 
international trade is set in U.S. dollars, even if the exports are not destined for 
the U.S.  Oil—along with other commodities—is priced in dollars,95 requiring 
countries that are oil consumers to accumulate dollars to pay for oil—mostly by 
exporting their goods and services to receive dollars as payment.96  Oil producing 
countries with excess dollar profits invest them in U.S. debt securities.  
International debt securities are in dollars.  The world’s central banks hold the 
majority of their reserves in dollars.  Under the Bretton Woods system, the U.S. 
undertook to convert dollars into gold upon demand and the gold-dollar exchange 
rate was valued at $35 dollars per ounce of gold.  Although the dollar-gold 
convertibility upon demand was broken by President Nixon in 1971, the dollar is 
still widely accepted as the world’s reserve.  Thus the U.S. alone can print U.S. 
paper money to meet global demand.  Because the world continues to desire these 
dollar securities, foreigners are also willing to pay more to hold them.  As a 
result, “Americans can purchase products at a marginally cheaper rate than other 
 
91 Id. at 21. 
92 James Goldgeier & Jeremi Suri, Revitalizing the U.S. National Security Strategy, WASHINGTON Q. 
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94 Id. at 17. 
95 See generally DAVID E. SPIRO, THE HIDDEN HAND OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY, PETRODOLLAR 
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nations, which must exchange their currency with each purchase and pay a 
transaction cost.”97 
While Americans complain about unfair trade, foreigners have complained 
about the unfairness of a system in which the currency of one country serves as 
the international currency for all countries.  For example, they “question whether 
the U.S. should have been permitted to run current account deficits approaching 6 
percent of GDP in the run-up to the crisis [of 2008].”98  They question why the 
U.S. does not have to “worry about balance of payments crises as it can pay for 
imports in dollars the Federal Reserve can just print.”99 
While the U.S. can print the dollar, the rest of the world must accumulate the 
dollar by producing and selling goods and services to others and get paid in 
dollars in return.  The dollars acquired by foreigners and accumulated abroad can 
only come about if those foreigners export, and often export a lot, in order to get 
dollars and save dollars as reserve.  Getting rid of free trade or preventing other 
countries from exporting to the U.S. market by imposing high tariffs could 
accelerate the erosion of dollar hegemony as other currencies vie to dethrone the 
dollar and replace it with a new reserve currency. 
Much has been written about trade and this Article will not rehash the 
substantial and thoughtful scholarship devoted to the pro-trade and pro-
globalization versus the anti-trade and anti-globalization debate.  There is no 
doubt that certain jobs have indeed moved out of the U.S. because trade 
liberalization made it easier for production to be globalized.  In a non-trivial 
number of cases, “foreign competition has hurt many U.S. metropolitan areas . . . 
which once had abundant manual-labor manufacturing jobs, often involving the 
production of clothing, footwear, luggage, furniture and other household 
consumer items.”100  Job loss and dislocation concentrated in certain sectors of the 
economy will need to be addressed—although not in this Article—if for no other 
reason than to alleviate political opposition to trade.  It should be noted that 
different proposals have already been suggested—from, on the one hand, trade 
adjustment assistance programs101 and better job-training directed toward helping 
people “reintegrate into the labor market and acquire skills, rather than helping 
them exit the labor market”102 to, on the other hand, outright “bribes” to “buy off” 
the “losers” in trade.103 
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2017 Cao: Pride and Prejudice in U.S. Trade  17 
To sum up this Introduction, the purpose of this Article is to provide a micro 
evaluation of trade in two particularly thorny areas:  (1) job loss; and (2) import 
vs. export and the trade deficit in a trading system of globally fragmented 
production.  This Article also provides a broad, macro view of trade and its 
relationship with other parts of the international order—security and finance.  
This is because trade is a vital component of an integrated international system.  
Looking at trade in isolation will result in even more incoherence and 
disequilibrium, perhaps creating unintended consequences in ways that impact 
negatively on U.S. security and finances.  Trade is embedded in an international 
order—it is linked to national security and to international finance and relatedly, 
to the dollar’s unique status as a global reserve currency. 
The U.S. is not losing in trade.  The nature of trade has changed, but the 
trading system is not rigged against the U.S.  Indeed, rather than indict the trading 
system and malign countries that constitute the global poor, U.S. nationalists 
should instead see trade as beneficial to the U.S. and necessary to the continued 
health of the postwar international system. 
 
 
I. ZOOMING IN: JOB LOSS, TRADE DEFICITS, AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF 
TRADE 
 
A. Job Loss 
 
In a market economy, jobs cannot be guaranteed.  Companies have opened 
and closed, moved from one place to another, for reasons unrelated to trade.  
Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, for example, have both denounced Carrier for 
its plan to move twenty-one hundred jobs from Indiana to Mexico.104 Trump 
vowed never to buy Carrier air conditioners again.105  Sanders said that Carrier 
has “betrayed its own workers” and “betrayed the consumers of this country who 
buy their products.”106  
But Carrier has moved many times.  Between 1918 and 1921, Carrier moved 
its headquarters, research laboratory, and production facilities from Buffalo to 
Newark, and in 1931, consolidated everything in Syracuse only to later expand in 
the 1950s into then low-cost areas in the U.S., such as Indianapolis.107  Fortune 
500 companies have, as a regular course of doing business, shuffled headquarters 
and business through all the different states.  In 2014 alone, the following 
companies moved out of California:  Lockheed Martin moved to Maryland; 
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Rockwell Automation moved to Wisconsin; Northrop Grumman moved to 
Virginia.108  A host of mergers also resulted in the following corporations moving 
out of California—Pacific Telesis to AT&T in Texas, PacifiCare to UnitedHealth 
Group in Minnesota, and BankAmerica to the renamed Bank of America in North 
Carolina.109  Many corporations once based in New York left for other states—
Altria to Virginia; CVS Caremark to Rhode Island; International Paper to 
Tennessee.110 
If the claim against trade is that it facilitates job loss and hurts workers, then 
the departure of a company from California does result in job loss for a California 
worker whether the company at issue moved to Maryland or to Mexico, 
Connecticut or to China.  But no one denounced these moves and certainly not 
with the sense of outrage reserved for corporations that moved abroad.  As 
Sanders said in an interview, 
 
Let’s just give an example of a corporation that’s making money 
in America, today, but desiring to move to China or to Mexico to 
make even more money.  That is destroying the moral fabric of 
this country.  That is saying that I don't care that the workers, 
[sic] who have worked for decades.111 
 
Perhaps it is different for a company to move from one state to another state 
because despite job loss in one state, there is a corresponding job gain in another 
state and the company is still within the country.   But from that perspective, 
opposition to trade is not truly founded on worries that trade hurts workers but 
rather founded on nationalist grounds, that is, these jobs are American jobs and 
while they can be shifted from one state, to the detriment of workers in that state, 
to another state, they cannot be shifted out of the U.S.  Opposition to trade then is 
primarily grounded in economic nationalism.  We should not import more than 
we export because that results in the trade deficit, which is bad for the country.  
Job loss is a proxy for a deeper anxiety rooted in nationalism. 
What about job loss due to automation?  That has occurred unabatedly for 
decades.  Technological innovation has been controversial when machines 
replace workers.  The history of capitalism is rife with examples of creative 
destruction.112  In 1589, when William Lee sought a patent for his newly invented 
stocking frame knitting machine to free workers from the tedious job of hand-
knitting, Queen Elizabeth I refused, telling him thus, “Thou aimest high, Master 
Lee.  Consider thou what the invention could do to my poor subjects.  It would 
assuredly bring to them ruin by depriving them of employment, thus making them 
beggars.”113  Labor resistance to mechanization led Parliament to pass legislation 
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making the destruction of machines a crime punishable by death.114  The British 
government reacted sternly to the riots in Lancashire in 1779, explaining in a 
resolution that “[t]he sole cause of great riots was the new machines employed in 
cotton manufacture; the country notwithstanding has greatly benefited from their 
erection [and] destroying them in this country would only be the means of 
transferring them to another . . . to the detriment of the trade of Britain.”115  Over 
time, a shift in attitude more accepting of technological progress occurred.  One 
reason could be that industry became politically dominant over the artisan class; 
another is that consumers, inventors, and even workers benefitted from 
technology as average living standards improved. 
In the U.S., nineteenth century manufacturing was designed specifically to 
“de-skill” workers—that is, to displace the artisan shops, eliminating the need to 
acquire skills through the simplification and mechanization of tasks.116  The tug of 
war between machines and workers was long and rough.  On the one hand, in 
1955, manufacturers asserted that the lower costs of goods and services resulting 
from automation would benefit the entire population and that the interests of 
“wage earners” should not trump those of “the people as a whole.”117  On the 
other hand, in 1963, the President of the American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations [AFL-CIO] warned that job losses due to 
automation could reach a high of four million each year.118  President John F. 
Kennedy observed that “our Labor Department estimates that approximately 1.8 
million persons holding jobs are replaced every year by machines.”119 
Workers fought back and hard.  There were strikes by longshoremen at 
Atlantic and Gulf ports and printers in New York newspapers to protest the use of 
automated equipment.120  The United Steelworkers and Kaiser Steel Corporation 
signed a pact in which workers were assured that they would not lose their jobs 
due to automation.121  In 1963, the railroad industry and five brotherhood 
representing two hundred thousand employees fought over industry’s plan to 
eliminate sixty-five thousand jobs resulting from technological changes.122 
As early as 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson recommended the formation 
of a commission to study the effects of automation on workers.  In a litany of 
examples, the following were noted: 
 
At one plant, one man today operates one machine which 
performs more than 500 separate manufacturing functions that 
formerly took some 70 men to perform. . . . In a similar plant, 48 
men using automated equipment today turn out a finished 
product in 20 minutes.  Before automation, it took 400 men 40 
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minutes to do the same job. . . . In an electronics plant where 200 
men used to assemble 1,000 units a day, only two men now turn 
out just as many with the help of automatic machines. . . . A 
three-man crew in a “robot” steel mill turns out 217 miles of rod 
per day at more than twice the old rate and at one-tenth the old 
labor cost. . . . A major Government agency, using computers, 
has cut its clerical work force from 13,000 to 3,000 workers.123 
 
Using the Department of Labor’s calculation, the American Foundation on 
Automation and Employment stated that automation caused “the elimination of 
40,000 jobs a week, or more than two million a year.”124  
Fast forward to today.  Technology has continued to eliminate certain jobs 
but no longer with much fanfare.  For example, analysts observed that “[f]actory 
automation will result in a net loss of factory jobs.  But if we don't automate, then 
there will be a massive hemorrhaging.  If we lose the ability to be efficient 
manufacturers, then we’ve blown our economic future.”125  The U.S. auto 
industry invested $80 billion in a five-year period in the 1980s to minimize the 
labor content in its new cars, claiming that “the alternative—not having made that 
investment—means the pain would be greater for more people.”126 
Webb Wheel Products, which manufactures truck brakes parts, has entered 
the automation world by using the Doosan V550M, a machine that can easily spin 
a 130-pound brake drum, smooth the metal surface as well as drill holes, “all 
without missing a beat.  And it doesn't take vacations or ‘complain about 
anything,’ says Dwayne Ricketts, president of the Cullman, Alabama, 
company.”127  The Webb Wheel has spared the company from having to hire any 
additional workers in three years while simultaneously enjoying a twenty-five 
percent increase in production or three hundred thousand more drums.128 
For years then, manufacturing jobs have been reduced by technology.  This 
trend has now entered the service industry as well, “which employs more than 
two-thirds of the workforce in developed countries.  Technology is eliminating 
jobs in office buildings, retail establishments and other businesses consumers deal 
with every day.”129  For example, the jobs of telephone operators in New York 
City hotels paying $29.72 an hour are also being phased out as hotels transition 
into automated phone services instead.130  Automation is most likely to take over 
jobs that involve 
 
repetitive tasks that programmers can write software for—an 
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accountant checking a list of numbers, an office manager filing 
forms, a paralegal reviewing documents for key words to help in 
a case.  As software becomes even more sophisticated, victims 
are expected to include those who juggle tasks, such as 
supervisors and managers—workers who thought they were 
protected by a college degree.131 
 
Start-ups account for much of the job growth in the U.S. and other developed 
economies, as “software is allowing entrepreneurs to launch businesses with a 
third fewer employees than in the 1990s.  There is less need for administrative 
support and back-office jobs that handle accounting, payroll and benefits.”132  
Even universities have succumbed to the logic of automation—in 2013, North 
Carolina State University replaced human workers with a high-tech library robots 
called “bookBots” to retrieve books when requested by students.133 
Indeed, “[t]he impact of computerisation on labour market outcomes is well-
established in the literature, documenting the decline of employment in routine 
intensive occupations—i.e., occupations mainly consisting of tasks following 
well-defined procedures that can easily be performed by sophisticated 
algorithms.”134  The growing wage inequality in the past years can be partially 
attributed to the computer revolution, as “computerisation erodes wages for 
labour performing routine tasks, workers will reallocate their labour supply to 
relatively low-skill service occupations.”135  The computer revolution has created 
a highly polarized labor market with high demand for high-income, high-value 
jobs and low-income, manual jobs and correspondingly little demand for middle-
income routine jobs.136 
Jobs have been lost for different reasons.  Some jobs have been outsourced or 
offshored when companies move production out of the U.S.137  Other jobs cannot 
be outsourced or offshored because they must be performed at a particular 
location or because they require in-person interaction.  The work performed by 
cashiers might not be outsourced but can be automated.  Lowe’s has entered into 
a joint venture with a startup called Fellow Robots in which robots will perform 
many of the jobs of retail workers.  “Without ever needing a coffee or bathroom 
break, its voice recognition software, fluent in multiple languages, and laser 
sensor safety technology can do a better job than many of America’s five million 
or so retail workers.”138  “[W]hile some will laud this triumph of technology in 
terms of saving money, many others view it as a disaster for the low-wage, low-
skill labor market.”139  
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But automation is not limited only to low-skill.  Golf caddies are being 
replaced by a robot called the Caddytrek.140  Human workers are not needed to 
examine medical scans because now there is software that can discern troubling 
issues.  Software is picking out worrisome blots in medical scans.  Trains can run 
without conductors.  Cars will be driven without drivers.  Computers can spot 
profits in stock trades in milliseconds, sift through documents required for 
discovery in court cases, report and record power usage via digital utility meters 
at millions of homes.141  
Automation is also changing how certain jobs are organized and performed.  
Suitable Technology’s Beam, for example, specializes in “telepresence,” beaming 
employees from one business where there is scarce customer demand to another, 
where more workers are needed.142  Businesses can also opt to rent computer 
power on an as-needed basis rather than purchasing expensive machines and 
employing information technology workers to work them.143 
Automation is now all the more appealing to industry because technology has 
become “better, faster, stronger, more convenient and cheaper than before.  
Contrast this declining cost curve with wages, which generally head higher over 
time—even if they’re not goosed by legislation and don’t keep up with 
inflation.”144  In fact, by switching to technology, not only are companies able to 
save on costs, but they are also able to go around political change.  “Union rules 
and labor laws may slow the dismissal of employees, but no country is attempting 
to prohibit organizations from using technology that allows them to operate more 
efficiently—and with few employees.”145  Technology is seen as part of 
inexorable scientific progress, embedded in the technocratic realm devoid of 
politics. 
At the same time, machines have become both less expensive and more 
capable than ever.  And young consumers who grew up with technology often 
prefer to deal with machines—people line up to order food from automated 
kiosks even when there is no line for human cashiers.146  Because of consumer 
preferences, transactions are becoming self-serve.  Ordinary consumers are 
enabled by technology to do tasks for which companies used to have workers.  
Verizon offers its customers a way to fix problems without calling and waiting for 
a repairperson.  Customers can download Verizon’s In-home Agent software, 
which can assess problems in a cable box or the Internet connection and fix the 
problem in minutes.147  Other examples148 include the self-checkout lane.  
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Consumers who opt for using the machine themselves are opting in favor of 
machine over the cashier who used to work that cash register.  Buying 
merchandise online means fewer salespeople at brick and mortar stores.  Clicking 
“yes” in an email invitation to choose meeting times means what an office 
assistant used to do is now redundant.  Booking vacations online means the 
erosion of the job of the travel agent.  Wendy’s, for example, has begun 
transitioning to self-ordering kiosks.  Carl’s Jr. and Hardee’s are planning to have 
restaurants “entirely free of employees.”149  White Castle has also announced that 
due to rising labor costs, it would either raise prices by 50% or rely more on 
automation.150  
Moreover, in the era of big data151 generated by and culled from electronic 
messages, social networks, sensors, GPS signals, cell phones, and more, “large 
amounts of digital information exist on virtually any topic of interest to a 
business.”152  When budget cuts forced the Gary, Indiana public school system to 
slash its annual transportation budget by fifty percent, the school district relied on 
sophisticated software to create alternative, more efficient bus routes, resulting in 
a fifty percent reduction of bus drivers from 180 to 60.153 
Indeed, in a speech in 2015, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence 
Summers warned that the biggest economic issue of the future would not be the 
federal debt or competition from China but “the dramatic transformations that 
technology is bringing about.”154  Although this issue has been studied in 
scholarly circles, job loss due to automation has not been decried the way job loss 
due to trade has been.  It is easier to scapegoat Third World countries and scold 
them for their low wages than it is to order technology to stand still. 
 
B. The Trade Deficit 
 
The U.S. trade deficit is undeniably real.  But first and foremost, it is 
important to realize that “the most important economic truth to grasp about the 
U.S. trade deficit is that it has virtually nothing to do with trade policy.”155  
Rather, “[a] nation's trade deficit is determined by the flow of investment funds 
into or out of the country.  And those flows are determined by how much the 
people of a nation save and invest—two variables that are only marginally 
affected by trade policy.”156  But this issue—the trade deficit, savings, and 
investment—will be addressed later in this Part B. 
For now, this section looks at one part of the trade deficit, the part that relates 
to imports versus exports, leaving aside the issue of savings and investment for 
later.  When a country has a negative balance of trade where its imports exceed its 
exports, that country is said to have a trade deficit.  Therefore, “[a] trade deficit 
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represents an outflow of domestic currency to foreign markets.”157  In the national 
consciousness, trade with China is equated with “trade deficit.”  Although many 
of the concerns about trade with China are legitimate,158 it is important to focus 
on facts and view the deficit in general, and that with China in perspective.   
Although the world is indeed globally interconnected, it is also important to 
understand that there are limits to global trade, even with China.  Data breaking 
down U.S. personal consumption expenditures into different categories—such as 
durable goods (furniture, motor vehicles), non-durable goods (food, 
clothing/shoes), and services (housing, medical care)—and relatedly into the 
import content—particularly Chinese content—reveals a startling reality.  The 
percentage of American consumption expenditures on Chinese goods is only 
slightly more than one percent.159  Almost twenty-five percent of consumption 
spending is on nondurable goods such as gasoline and food and there is negligible 
Chinese content in those categories.  Where Chinese content is high is in clothing, 
footwear, furniture, and household equipment, but even these categories 
constitute only eight percent of total U.S. consumption.160  Moreover, even in 
categories where Chinese presence is strong—such as clothing and shoes where 
thirty-five percent of U.S. spending is indeed on goods from China—much of the 
value is derived from intermediate components that were not made in China.  
Thus, “after stripping out the foreign components (cotton, yarn, etc.) made 
elsewhere, only 14 percent of spending in this small category is really going to 
China.”161  The facts demonstrate that much of U.S. spending is on services that 
are not as amenable to being traded internationally. 
Anxieties rise when a country imports more than it exports and incurs a trade 
deficit.  To understand the trade deficit, the changing nature of trade in which 
production is globally disaggregated must be untangled.  Second, the issue of 
whether imports are bad and exports are good must be further scrutinized.  And 
third, whether the trade deficit causes job loss must also be further examined. 
 
1. Vertical Integration of Trade and a Much Needed Value-Added Perspective 
 
As noted in the Introduction, vertical integration or international 
fragmentation of production, as it has also been called, has meant that many 
products are not made “somewhere” but rather, “everywhere.”  Processing and 
manufacturing take place across vertically integrated companies that are 
themselves part of global supply or value chains transcending national borders; 
and intermediate components used to manufacture one product might be a final 
product sold by a subsidiary.162 
The reduction of transportation costs and the proliferation of cutting-edge 
technologies have facilitated globalization of production, which means that 
 
157 Trade Deficit, INVESTOPEDIA (2017), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trade_deficit.asp (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2017). 
158 See Cao, supra note 35.  
159 IRWIN, supra note 75, at 24. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 See Kevin B. Sobel-Read, Global Value Chains: A Framework for Analysis, 5 TRANSNAT’L 
LEGAL THEORY 364, 368–69 (2014) (providing a detailed analysis of global value chains). 
2017 Cao: Pride and Prejudice in U.S. Trade  25 
companies now relocate different stages of manufacturing to different areas of the 
world.  Few companies make one product in its entirety in one country.  
Production is sliced and diced into different tasks with each task centered in a 
different geographical location.  “Goods exchanged across borders, more 
importantly, are only fragments of final goods.”163  Through global supply chains, 
“intermediate goods are traded across borders and more parts and components are 
imported for use in exports.”164 
Global trade, nonetheless, still uses antiquated rules of origin to determine the 
nationality of a product, and from such determination, assess the level of tariff or 
which import restraints apply to such product.165  Therefore, trade statistics as to 
which country the product is from, and relatedly which country the U.S. imports 
the most from and runs the highest trade deficit with, are often unreliable. 
Take as an example a car made by a U.S. manufacturer.  No fewer than nine 
countries were involved in its production, marketing, and sales.  Thirty percent of 
the car’s value went to Korea for assembly, 17.5% to Japan for components and 
technology, 4% to Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts, 2.5% to the United 
Kingdom for advertising and marketing, and 11.5% to Ireland and Barbados for 
data processing.166  Although this car constituted an import, most of its cost was 
still incurred in the U.S., with thirty-seven percent of the production value of the 
car coming from America.167  To characterize it merely as an import obscures the 
contacts embedded in its production chain and the relatively significant U.S. 
footprint in this process. 
Trade with Mexico has been singled out and denigrated because it is equated 
with job loss and trade deficits, but the picture is more complex because of the 
vertical integration or production sharing.  Much of Mexico-U.S cross-border 
trade is embedded in a formal production sharing arrangement, which means that 
“[m]any imports and exports are therefore of a temporary nature as an item is 
being produced.  Cars built in North America, for example, are said to cross the 
United States’ borders eight times during production, integrating materials and 
parts developed in Mexico and Canada.”168  Production sharing occurs in other 
industries as well, such as electronics, appliances, and machinery.  Because 
Mexican production processes are deeply integrated with those in the U.S., “a full 
40% of the content of U.S. imports from Mexico was originally made in the 
United States . . . .”169  Indeed, U.S. imports from Mexico actually contain a 
significant amount of U.S. content.  Therefore, a product may be formally labeled 
“Made in Mexico,” but the product itself contains parts made in the U.S. by U.S. 
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workers, which means that “a large portion of the money U.S. consumers spend 
on Mexican imports actually goes to U.S. companies and workers.”170  For those 
concerned about the imports-exports distinction, U.S. imports from Mexico 
actually contain a significant number of components that the U.S. had previously 
exported to Mexico.171 
In the same way that an import labeled “Made in Mexico” may have as much 
as forty percent U.S. content, another product, let’s say, labeled “Made in China,” 
may have, conversely, very little Chinese content.  A Barbie doll priced at $9.99 
and considered “Made in China” actually contained only thirty-five cents worth 
of Chinese content, mostly in low wages paid to the eleven thousand peasant 
women working in Guangdong Province.172  Yet the entire export value of two 
dollars—about one-fifth of the eventual retail price—was charged to China 
although a chain of other countries was involved in the production process.  Saudi 
Arabian oil was refined to produce ethylene, which Taiwan used to make vinyl 
plastic pellets that formed Barbie’s body.  Her nylon hair came from Japan.  
Cardboard packing came from the U.S.  Hong Kong managed everything else.  
“Eventually, after transoceanic shipping, domestic trucking, advertising and other 
functions that employ thousands of workers in the United States the Anaheim 
Barbie will achieve her full price, resulting in at least a $1 profit per doll for 
Mattel.”173 
As to the doll’s two-dollar export value, a portion was taken by each country 
that participated in the production chain.  Trade ledgers, however, ascribed the 
entire two-dollar export value to China.  In 1995, U.S. Customs reported that toys 
imported from China made up a total of $5.4 billion, constituting one-sixth of the 
total U.S.-China trade deficit.174  China’s actual share of the Barbie doll is 
important because the continuing trade deficit in China’s favor touches U.S. 
national nerves.  As Arjun Appadurai, a cultural anthropologist, aptly observed, 
“The America-China trade issue is a red herring.  It fails to take into account a 
much more complex set of values, of energies, of labour, and of nationalism 
congealed into a package that carries the emotional label ‘Made in China.’”175 
The trend towards global rather than one-country production is also reflected 
in the manufacture of the iPhone and iPad.  Apple uses suppliers to provide it 
with the needed components in the globally fragmented production chain, with 
Apple capturing the largest share of value.  Apple retains most of its design, 
software and product development, marketing, and other high-wage functions in 
the U.S.  For example, the company pays more in wages to workers in the U.S. 
than to its entire offshore supply chain.176  Apple kept about 30% of the sales of 
its low-end $499 sixteen gigabyte wifi-only iPad and 58% of the sales price of the 
iPhone 4.  In both cases, these are far greater than the value amounts received by 
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any other firms in the supply chain.177  Second to Apple are Korean companies, 
such as LG and Samsung, which provided the display and memory chips and 
which garnered gross profits of 5% and 7%, respectively, of the sales price of the 
iPhone and iPad.  Next are Japanese and Taiwanese suppliers, which capture 1–
2% each.178  Each unit sold in the U.S. added between $229 and $275—the 
amount constituting the estimated factory cost of an iPhone or iPad—to the U.S.-
China trade deficit but only about ten dollars in labor wages are paid to Chinese 
workers.179 
Given the increased reliance on global supply chains, it is important to 
understand that 
 
[j]ust because a country is the final exporter of a good does not 
mean that it is responsible for the majority of that good’s 
production. . . . [W]e can no longer look at official gross export 
statistics to see who produces goods for whom.  Because of the 
global fragmentation of supply chains, we must isolate how 
much value-added a nation contributes to the production of a 
good in order to illuminate the true comparative advantage of 
nations.180 
 
The continued preoccupation with the manufacturing or assembly stage of 
production ignores the “full spectrum of ways in which the generation of a 
product constitutes the supply chain, simultaneously dictating the roles of the 
firms within that chain and the distributions of power among them.”181  
A value-added focus, as opposed to one focused on gross exports, is more 
accurate when there is vertical integration of production because it “corrects for 
the distortions of imported intermediates in gross trade to provide a clarified 
understanding of the characteristics of a nation’s production.”182  In the case of 
the U.S., if one looks at the electronics industry, for example, using conventional 
gross trade statistics, one would conclude that it is in decline.  If, however, 
looking at the same industry using value-added statistics, one would see a much 
more robust and optimistic picture.183  
A report to the G20,184 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the WTO recognized that the most 
value in the global supply chain web is value in upstream activities such as new 
concept development and research and development, and in a limited type of 
downstream activities such as marketing, branding, or customer service.185 
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Although a product’s assembly constitutes but a mere ten percent of the total 
value of a product, as reflected in the final consumer price, “this 10% determines 
the applied tariff rate.  The remaining 90% of the final product's value is not taken 
into account when determining the origin, and therefore the tariff.”186  Because 
rules of origin do not rely on assessment of value but rather merely changes in 
tariff heading, they “skew[] trade statistics, because the relative share of raw 
materials, R&D, intellectual property, and marketing are not factored into the 
total value of the product.”187  
In reality, despite handwringing about losing in trade, developed countries 
such as the U.S. and Japan remain dominant powers at the upstream of global 
supply chains and “continue to carry out sophisticated tasks like design and the 
production of intermediate inputs.  Emerging markets like China and Mexico on 
the other hand, tend to be relatively downstream, still focused on assembly to 
some degree.”188  This reality is reflected not just in the iPhone, but also in other 
electronics products as well, such as the Nokia N95 smartphone, assembled in 
Finland and China.  Researchers who disassembled the Nokia N95, examined its 
six hundred individual components, and traced the product’s global supply chain 
discovered that in both cases, European value-added share was impressively high 
whether the device was assembled in Finland or China.189 
In the former case, where the phone was assembled in Finland, the value-
added share of Europe was 68%; in the latter case, where the phone was 
assembled in China, the value-added share of Europe was still high—51% even 
though Europe had “little role in supplying the physical components”190 and even 
though the phone was labeled “Made in China.”  Europe’s capture of 51% of such 
phones was possible because Finland and other European countries dominated the 
upstream process—“branding, development, design, and management.”191  
Although the final assembly is the stage that gives physical manifestation to the 
product, it only constitutes two percent of the value-added.192 
Broad conclusions can be drawn from the Nokia study and extrapolated into 
other industries such as textiles and automobiles.  The country of assembly 
 
commands only a few per cent of the supply chain’s overall 
value added in the case of an advanced industrial good. . . . 
[T]he developed countries continue to capture the lion’s share of 
value added generated globally.  Even in the case of 
manufactured goods, it is services (both the ones provided in-
house as well as those purchased from outside vendors) and 
various forms of intangibles (including returns earned on various 
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forms of intellectual property) that capture most of the value 
added.193 
 
Nationalist anxieties aside, the U.S. is still perched upstream of global supply 
chains, controlling more value-added, sophisticated tasks such as design and 
production of intermediate products.194  In an era in which anxieties about 
“losing” to other countries dominate the national discourse, it is all the more 
important that trade statistics accurately reflect the fragmented reality of trade and 
the role of developed countries, such as the U.S., along the supply chain. 
Even in manufacturing where it is charged the U.S. has “lost” to other 
countries, 
 
value-added measures of trade demonstrate that far from losing 
competitiveness in advanced manufacturing industries like 
electronics, the U.S. continues to have a robust and growing 
comparative advantage in these industries.  The dramatic 
difference in trend for the U.S. between analyzing comparative 
advantage using the value-added and gross trade approaches 
emphasizes the importance of helping policymakers interpret 
official trade statistics correctly.195 
 
The value-added data demonstrates that the U.S. has a solid comparative 
advantage in advanced manufacturing, particularly in areas such as electronics 
and equipment, which constitute the highest level of technology manufacturing.196  
Studies confirm this observation:  that jobs in the U.S. subject to the steepest 
declines are basic manufacturing jobs and those subject to increase are those in 
“innovative manufacturing”: 
 
Innovative manufacturing jobs are those where the 
manufacturing itself is innovative or proprietary such that 
companies will want to keep them in-house.  Some companies 
have already begun to do this. GE Aviation, for instance, has 
invested millions of dollars in over 30 sites in the United States, 
with the latest advanced manufacturing plant being built in 
Alabama in 2013.197 
 
The point is that a value-added framework better reflects the proliferation of 
global supply chains, and consequently the multi-country production process that 
currently prevails in the international system.  The WTO recognized this 
emerging consensus when Director-General Pascal Lamy coined the phrase 
“Made in the World” to introduce an initiative that would measure trade by value 
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added rather than by the current country of origin rules because “traditional 
measurement of foreign trade alone no longer suffices to explain how [the 
country] fits into the world economy.”198  As Lamy noted, “by focusing on gross 
values of exports and imports, traditional trade statistics give us a distorted 
picture of trade imbalances between countries.”199  The WTO has further 
acknowledged that “attributing the full commercial value of imports to the last 
country of origin can skew bilateral trade balances, pervert the political debate on 
trade imbalances, and may lead to wrong and counter-productive decisions.”200 
The WTO’s “Made in the World Initiative” (MiWi) is designed to support 
“the exchange of projects, experiences and practical approaches in measuring and 
analysing trade in value added.”201  Its core objectives are to incorporate the 
implications of global value chains and of the “Made in the World” global reality 
into trade policy, including the use of value-added statistics.202  Trade is better 
measured on the basis of value added rather than on the basis of country of 
origin,203 which is inaccurate because it is premised on the notion that production 
can be deemed originating in one country or has a distinct center of gravity 
around one country.  Some politicians have also understood that fragmentation of 
production cannot be ignored and that how trade is measured and analyzed must 
reflect this new globalized reality.  Karel De Gucht, the European Commissioner 
for Trade, explained why the current scheme is not accurate:  it “is a bit like the 
final runner in a relay team getting a gold medal while his team-mates get silver 
and bronze. It doesn’t take account of the fact that the final result is the product of 
a joint effort.”204  Commissioner De Gucht also observed as follows, with respect 
to Europe, 
 
when we look at trade in value as opposed to traditional 
statistics, our trade deficit with China is reduced by 36%.  
However, our overall trade balance does not change. Our deficits 
with other partners, such as Canada or Japan for example, will 
increase to offset these changes.  We need to bear all these 
numbers in mind when thinking about our surpluses or deficits 
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with our trading partners.  China, for instance, starts to look like 
less of a problem.205 
 
In determining where the product was made, one must take into account 
 
the value (and the location) of the design, R&D, marketing, 
transport, and perhaps even the sales (retail) of the final product.  
Ultimately, these steps in the production process are equally, if 
not more, important than the mere assembly of the product.  
Moreover, these steps contribute significantly to the good’s 
overall value.  Indeed, the value added at these steps generally 
exceeds the value of the production or assembly activities.206 
 
Using this approach, it is obvious that service and manufacturing are linked.  
The blurring of these two sectors has been referred to as “servitization,” 
“servicification,” or the “manuservice economy,” and it has been suggested that 
value added in those servicing phases of the production process should be 
incorporated in a product’s rules of origin determination.207  A detailed 
exploration of rules of origin is beyond the scope of this Article208 but, as a 
starting point, one might stipulate that origin might be conferred on a country 
where a certain percentage of the value of a product (for example, fifty percent) is 
added to the final value of the product, taking into account the following stages of 
the production process:  research and development, design, intellectual property, 
manufacturing, and marketing.209 
Understanding how global supply or global value chains work also means 
understanding that economies today are interwoven. Commissioner De Gucht 
aptly cautioned as follows: 
 
[I]n buying something from a distant producer instead of from 
our neighbour we are actually doing the right thing for the 
neighbourhood. . . . Because when you look at trade only briefly 
you may jump to the conclusion that imports are bad for jobs 
and so we should keep them out. . . . But the insights from global 
value chains should help people to understand that imports are 
valuable in and of themselves.  Because today most people in 
their own daily work have experience of a supply chain, whether 
within a small company or a large multinational.  Few 
businesses make a product from start to finish and sell it to a 
consumer themselves.  We might make a component, provide 
legal advice or support the product’s sale through marketing.  
But we know that our work depends on many other people for it 
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to succeed.210 
 
In other words, even through a purely nationalist, self-interested lens, it 
should be clear that imports are not the enemy.  Equally important is the fact that 
because many products the U.S. imports, especially from developing countries, 
may also contain a large percentage of its own U.S. value-added components, so 
protectionism in the forms of increased tariffs, for example, would end up hurting 
domestic upstream firms.211  For example, in 2007, forty percent of the double 
counting in U.S. exports212 came from U.S. domestic content being shipped back 
to the U.S. as imports, whereas nearly all of the double counting in China’s 
processing exports came from imported, non-Chinese foreign content.213  
Furthermore, 
 
[b]ecause China is the final assembler in a large number of 
global supply chains, and it uses components from many other 
countries, especially East Asian countries, its trade surplus with 
U.S. and Western EU countries measured in value-added term is 
41% and 49% less than that measured in gross terms.214 
 
This demonstrates that U.S. export producers tend to be upstream within global 
supply chains whereas Chinese export producers tend to be relatively 
downstream.215 
Nothing in this section is meant to deny the decline of U.S. manufacturing in 
certain sectors—for example, steel, textile, shoes—or the reality of the trade 
deficit.  Nonetheless, trade should be reconceptualized to take into account the 
shift from single-country to multi-country production; from singular production 
in the trade in goods to fragmentation of production in the trade in tasks.  Put 
another way, trade statistics should be “debilateralize[d]” in an era of 
“multilocated” production.216  This reconceptualization is important simply 
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because facts matter.  First, as a practical matter, the new framework is a better 
reflection of what is actually going on in the world.  Second, reconceptualization 
should result also in practical changes that have significant policy implications 
such as more accurate information about trading partners.217  For example, as 
noted previously, under the traditional gross trade statistics model, the U.S. has a 
$2 billion trade deficit in iPhones trade with China for 2009, but under a value-
added trade statistics model, the deficit is $73 million, mostly reflecting labor 
costs incurred in China.218  Third, more accurate trade statistics also show that, 
despite nationalist denunciations of trade in the U.S., the U.S. is in fact still 
competitive even in high levels of manufacturing; that gross trade statistics can be 
misleading and U.S. high value-added activities are embedded in gross import 
figures that exaggerate import activities; and that job loss can be the result of 
economic shifts as well as technological transformation. 
To bring further clarity to the trade picture, the next section zooms in some 
more and looks at imports versus exports.  This section shows that restricting 
imports in one industry may cause harm to other domestic industries.  More 
broadly and more importantly for the purposes of this Article, it corrects the false 
assumption that imports are good and exports are bad. 
 
2. Imports Versus Exports:  Two Sides of the Same Coin 
 
Even assuming imports are bad, restricting them does not necessarily lead to 
the desired result, which is presumably to rejuvenate domestic industry and help 
domestic workers in the protected industry.  For example, in September 2009, 
President Barack Obama imposed duties on car and truck tires from China, 
adding a 35% tariff to the preexisting 3 to 4% tariff for the first year, 30% in the 
second year, and 25% in the third year.219  The tariffs did result in a 30% decrease 
in tire imports from China between 2009 and 2011 but that did not mean 30% 
more tires were made in the U.S.  According to the U.S. International Trade 
Commission, all it meant was 30% more tire imports from Canada, 110% more 
from South Korea, 44% more from Japan, 152% more from Indonesia, 154% 
more from Thailand; 117% more from Mexico, and 285% more from Taiwan.220  
Domestic tire producers were also able to increase price with impunity as some 
consumers switched to domestic tires, resulting in a total net cost to consumers of 
$1.112 billion per year—$817 million due to the higher cost of imported tires, 
and $295 million due the increased cost of domestic tires.221  The higher tariffs 
“saved” about twelve hundred jobs which meant it cost consumers $900 thousand 
per job saved, as the average worker in the tire industry made $40 thousand a 
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year.222  This is inefficient to say the least.  
Moreover, import restrictions also destroy jobs in downstream industries that 
use imports as intermediate components.  Given the prevalence of global 
fragmentation of production described above, reliance on global supply chains for 
the manufacture of a product means that the majority of U.S. imports are not final 
consumer products but intermediate goods used by U.S. firms in their own 
production.  Trade restrictions that raise the price of such intermediate goods have 
a negative impact on downstream producers that use those goods, which in turn 
adversely affects employment in those downstream industries.  
For example, it is well-known that the U.S. has protected the sugar industry 
for years through “a Byzantine combination of price supports and arbitrary import 
restrictions.”223  The high price of U.S. sugar caused by sugar tariffs has protected 
huge sugarcane conglomerates and at the same time inflicted harm on U.S. 
industries that use sugar, such as the sugar-refining and candy industries.224  In 
2002, LifeSavers candy plant that used 250,000 pounds of sugar to produce 3 
million rolls of LifeSavers per day and employed 650 workers in Michigan shut 
down and moved to Canada.225  Citing the high cost of sugar—with sugar costing 
twice as much in the United States as in Canada and Mexico—the company, 
which was founded in Cleveland in 1912 and moved to Michigan in 1967, 
rejected the $38 million incentive package offered by Michigan to keep the 
company in the U.S.226 
Other makers of hard candy in the U.S., such as Primrose and Brach’s, have 
also relocated, blaming “their shifting production strategies on one culprit:  U.S. 
sugar subsidies that keep prices of domestic sugar much higher than prices on the 
world market.  In addition, tight import quotas make it hard to import cheaper 
foreign-produced sugar.”227  Brach’s warned in 1990 that the company would 
close its plant and move to Mexico or Canada “if it did not win federal approval 
to import sugar at world trade prices.  Because of the federal government’s 
protectionist trade policies toward its own sugar growers, Brach’s is required to 
buy more expensive domestic sugar.”228  In 2001, Brach’s closed its plant in 
Chicago, a city once known for its many candy companies.  In 2006, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce reported that for the past twenty-five years, U.S. sugar 
price has been two to three times higher than world sugar price, which has 
resulted “in a significant competitive cost disadvantage for domestic sugar-
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containing products manufacturers.” 229  
Employment in industries that use sugar as an intermediate component fell by 
more than 11,000 between 1997 and 2002, at least 6,400 of which the Commerce 
Department attributed to plant relocation due to the high cost of domestic sugar; 
by contrast, employment in the non-sugar-containing food industry rose by more 
than 30,000.230  Although there were only about 61,000 workers in the sugar 
growing industry, and more than 900,000 in the sugar-using industries, trade 
barriers were enacted to protect the sugar-growing industry; even then, it is 
estimated that only 2,260 of those sugar-growing jobs were shielded by trade 
barriers, which means that consumers bore $826,000 in cost to protect each job 
that was saved.231  
The same phenomenon—trade restrictions in one industry creating adverse 
employment consequences in related domestic industries—can be seen in 
numerous examples, such as the imposition of high duties or price floors on 
imported flat-panel displays and semiconductors used by domestic makers of 
laptop computers, causing them to shift production out of the U.S.; or the 
imposition of voluntary restraint agreements limiting steel imports to help the 
domestic steel industry but inflicting damage to the many more numerous 
domestic users of steel, including auto makers such as General Motors and 
construction industries with companies such as Caterpillar and John Deere.232 
More than the fact that import restrictions often create other unintended self-
inflicted wounds, as described above, is the fact that import restrictions also 
negatively affect a country’s exports.  Exports are generally favored by 
nationalists.  Imports are not.  Despite the WTO’s acceptance of nominally free 
trade rules, mercantilist vestiges remain so that although states agree to be 
constrained by free trade rules, many still revert to old mercantilist ways in which 
“[e]xportation is gain, but all Commodities Imported is loss.”233  
The U.S., for example, aims to improve exports—but certainly not increase 
imports.  The Obama Administration’s trade policy consisted of the National 
Export Initiative with the goal of doubling U.S. exports by 2015.234  Import tariffs 
are justified on the ground that they protect American jobs.  But in actuality, as 
shown by the famous Lerner symmetry theorem, export taxes and import tariffs 
have a symmetric impact on trade.  If a country wants to restrict trade, it can use 
an import or an export tax because their effects on the terms of trade are 
identical.235  Lerner’s paper shows that although it is often assumed that exports 
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are good for a country and imports are not because they can lead to trade 
deficits—or that imports and exports are independent of one another—in fact, any 
restriction a country imposes on imports also functions as an equivalent 
restriction on exports.  Import tariffs negatively affect jobs in export industries.236 
On a general, intuitive level, it is not difficult to see that import restrictions 
will lead to a decrease in exports as well.  Exports and imports are not separate 
and independent from each other, but rather they are “the flip side of the same 
coin.  Exports are the goods a country must give up in order to acquire imports.  
Exports are necessary to generate the earnings to pay for imports.”237  For 
example, if foreign countries reduce their exports to the U.S. because the U.S. 
imposes high tariffs on their products, they will not be able to accumulate dollars 
needed to purchase American products.  
The two are intertwined in another way.  Assume the U.S. reduces its tariffs 
on Chilean imports, which will become cheaper to U.S. consumers who will then 
want to purchase such goods.  U.S. demand for Chilean goods will increase, 
which can be met only when consumers in the U.S. (indirectly) sell dollars on the 
foreign exchange market to buy Chile’s peso—to pay for Chilean goods.238  As 
dollar holders increase their demand for pesos, the value of the dollar will decline 
relative to the peso, or put another way, the value of the peso will rise relative to 
the dollar, making Chilean goods more expensive and restraining demand for 
them.  
The point of the example is as follows:  although it was the U.S. that lowered 
its tariff on Chilean products—and although Chile made no changes to its 
tariffs—Chile will end up purchasing more American goods.  As explained 
above, once the value of the dollar declines relative to the peso, the price of U.S. 
goods in pesos becomes cheaper for Chileans and thus Chilean demand for U.S. 
goods increases.239 
The connection between imports and exports also means that trade 
intervention aimed at restricting imports will be offset by restrictions in exports.  
“Throughout U.S. history, large tariff increases have failed to stimulate greater 
employment because any increase in employment in import-competing industries 
was offset by a decrease in employment in industries that are export oriented.”240  
This was the case in the 1930s as well when the U.S. imposed huge Smoot-
Hawley tariff increases to protect domestic industry and boost domestic 
employment.  The result was a corresponding almost one-for-one decrease in 
exports, resulting in job losses in the U.S. export industries.241 
In addition, given the fact that, as previously noted,242 eighty percent of world 
trade occurs “either within MNC [multinational corporations] networks or 
through supply chains organized by MNCs . . . [,] it is important to understand the 
 
236 Moran & Oldenski, supra note 79. 
237 IRWIN, supra note 75 at 90.  It is well-known that China is a major exporting country but its 
exports figures are also matched by high imports figures.  Id. at 91. 
238 Id. at 92. 
239 Id. at 93. 
240 Id. 
241 See Theodore Phalan et al., The Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the Great Depression, FOUND. FOR 
ECON. EDUC. (Feb. 29, 2012), (discussing the negative effects the tariffs had on American exports). 
242 Moran & Oldenski, supra note 79. 
2017 Cao: Pride and Prejudice in U.S. Trade  37 
impact of trade measures on today’s world in which trade and investment are 
intertwined and in which the ‘us versus them’ mentality is fundamentally 
misguided.”243  The prevalence of global supply chains means more than ever that 
the U.S. export sector is intertwined with its import sector.  “The biggest 
exporters from the United States are U.S. MNCs and foreign MNC affiliates 
located in the United States,”244 offering higher than average wages and benefits 
paid by all other firms in the U.S.  Blocking imports either through quotas or 
tariffs would harm not just downstream American users of those imports or the 
U.S. consumers but also U.S. exporters because multinational exporters “rely on 
their international supply chains to keep their US operations competitive in 
international markets.”245  
More than fifty percent of American imports are affiliated transactions, in 
which U.S.-headquartered firms import from their foreign affiliates or 
alternatively, in which foreign firms operating in the U.S. import from their 
parent corporations.246  Moreover, because more than sixty percent of American 
imports are intermediate components for other firms located in the U.S., blocking 
these imports will hurt those other U.S. firms, their foreign affiliates and foreign 
firms doing business in the U.S. because doing so will impede the smooth 
operation of companies that are connected via the global supply chains.  “A tariff 
on imported goods would undermine the strongest companies with operations in 
the United States and hinder their ability to continue to pay the highest wages to 
U.S. workers.”247  
Return to the Apple example.  As discussed previously, because the 
manufacture of the Apple iPhone and iPad is done via a global supply chain, 
Chinese labor and inputs constitute only between two and five percent of the total 
value of the final products, with about six percent going to component suppliers 
in other countries besides China and “overwhelming majority of the value [going] 
to Apple itself and other firms in the United States.”248  More important to the 
point made here about the symbiotic relationship between import and export 
sectors, if Apple was not allowed access to lower-cost imported intermediate 
components, it is not simply that U.S. consumers would be faced with higher 
prices for Apple products, but, additionally, Apple’s exports would themselves 
fall.  This would have the effect of hurting the American export sector and other 
U.S. workers in the export sector connected to Apple; market share of phones 
would shift to other non-U.S. producers.249  
There would be other ripple effects as well.  Trade statistics highlight imports 
and exports of goods—but that is only part of the picture.  The American export 
sector, which everyone wishes to promote and protect, is itself linked to the U.S. 
service industry which contributes much of the value added to the research, 
design, manufacturing, distribution, and marketing of U.S. goods.  Data gathered 
by the OECD reveals a breakdown of “the share of services that are embodied in 
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each country’s exports and indicates the extent to which those services are 
provided by domestic or foreign firms.”250  About fifty percent of the value of 
exports of U.S. goods comes from the U.S. service sector, a figure that is 
comparable to other developed countries, but is much higher than that of lesser-
developed economies such as China and Mexico.251  This matches what was 
discussed in the preceding section about the significant role the U.S. has in 
upstream production and upstream servicing of products produced via global 
supply chains. 
Equally important to the discussion about the relationship between imports 
and exports is the fact that the service component embodied within U.S. goods 
exports itself contains a high level of U.S. content—96.5%, compared with 93.3% 
for Canada, 90.6% for Mexico, 90% for France, 88.6% for China, 86.3% for the 
Netherlands, 88% for Germany, and 84.2% for Sweden.252  What this means is 
that not only do U.S. goods exports contain a high percentage—more than 50%—
of embedded services, but additionally that the U.S. content of such services itself 
is very high—96.5%.  The U.S. service sector is an important sector for the U.S. 
economy and the U.S. has been able to retain a comparative advantage in high-
end services to the benefit of skilled U.S. service workers.253  Equally significant 
to the point made in this section, this service sector is intertwined with the 
manufacturing sector generally and more particularly with the U.S. export sector, 
which is in turn intertwined with imports. Lines everywhere are indeed blurred. 
 
a. Trade Deficit, Employment and Balance of Payments 
 
Job loss—and job gain—happens for many reasons.  Generally speaking, 
economists believe that “the level of unemployment is determined more by the 
business cycle than by changes in trade flows or trade policy.”254  Jobs are 
constantly created and destroyed in a dynamic economy.  Except from 1970 to 
1975, high unemployment rates are not correlated with increases in imports as a 
share of GDP and in fact, since the early 1980s, the unemployment rate has gone 
down even as the imports-to-GDP ratio has gone up.255  The trade deficit usually 
rises when unemployment falls and falls when unemployment rises; a strong 
economy supports job gain and imports and a weak economy is associated with 
job loss, which decreases spending on imports.256  In addition, according to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, competition from imports and relocations of plants 
overseas accounted for only three percent of total employment displacement in 
recent years; during the 2008 financial crisis, layoffs reached two million in 2009 
 
250 Id. at 4. 
251 Id. 
252 See id. 
253 Id.  Over the last decade, employment in U.S. business-service sector grew by more than twenty 
percent while employment in manufacturing decreased by more than twenty percent. 
254 IRWIN, supra note 75, at 116. 
255 Id. 
256 Griswold, supra note 73 (“Trade deficits do not cost jobs.  In fact rising trade deficits correlate 
with falling unemployment rates.  Far from being a drag on economic growth, the U.S. economy has 
actually grown faster in years in which the trade deficit has been rising than in years in which the deficit 
has shrunk.”); see also IRWIN, supra note 75, at 155. 
2017 Cao: Pride and Prejudice in U.S. Trade  39 
but less than one percent of those layoffs were due to imports.257 
Critics charge that the U.S. trade deficit means that the U.S. is losing in trade 
or that U.S. exporters face unfair barriers in foreign countries.  “The obvious 
implication is that, if other nations were to open their markets as wide as we have 
supposedly opened ours, or if American companies became more competitive 
against foreign rivals, we could export more relative to imports, thus reducing the 
trade deficit.”258  Over and over, the trade deficit is used as evidence that the U.S. 
is harmed by trade. 
But to understand the trade deficit, one cannot see it in terms of imports 
versus exports alone.  One needs to see it in balance-of-payments accounting 
terms.  Balance of payments is an accounting of a country’s international 
transactions, used to keep track of a country’s imports and exports.  When U.S. 
consumers and businesses buy imports, they pay for them in dollars but the 
dollars “eventually return to purchase either U.S. goods (exports) or U.S. assets 
(foreign investment)”259 which in turn boost U.S. employment.  Sales of U.S. 
goods or assets to non-U.S. residents are recorded as a positive entry or a credit in 
the balance of payments and conversely, purchases of foreign goods and assets 
are recorded as a negative entry or a debit.  “While the data, itself, is neutral, it is 
sometimes reported in ominous tones, especially when the numbers total up to a 
deficit in the merchandise account.”260 
The balance of payments is categorized further as the following:  first, the 
current account, which includes essentially trade in goods (airplanes, wheat, cars, 
and so on) and services (tourism, technical training, concert musicians, and 
financial services); and second, the financial account, which includes trade in 
assets, mainly in portfolio and direct investments. 
In accounting, the balance of payments balances, that is, by definition, “the 
balance of payments sums to zero.”261  This is because 
 
what a country buys or gives away in the global market must 
equal what it sells or receives—because of the exchange nature 
of trade.  People . . . will generally not give up something 
without receiving something of comparable value in return.  The 
double-entry nature of international bookkeeping means that, for 
a nation as a whole, the value of what it gives to the rest of the 
world will be matched by the value of what it receives.262 
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Thus, the current account + financial account = 0.  With that equation in 
mind, this means that a country with a current account deficit will have an 
offsetting financial account surplus.  “Goods, services, and resources traded 
internationally are paid for; thus every movement of products is offset by a 
balancing movement of money or some other financial asset.”263  A surplus in the 
current account by definition is offset by a deficit in the financial account—“if we 
export goods and services, then we import financial assets of the foreigners who 
purchased those goods and services.”264  Conversely, a deficit in the current 
account by definition is offset by a surplus in the financial account—“if 
Americans import foreign products, then we export our financial assets to pay for 
them.”265  This means “American money and other financial assets flow out of the 
country to foreigners.”266  Generally speaking, American money—U.S. dollars—
is mostly useful for American purchases and thus, “holders of American money 
have a claim on American assets” such as currency, treasury bills, stocks in 
American companies, government or corporate bonds, houses, office buildings, 
office franchises, and so on.267 
Take the following concrete example.  If the U.S. buys more goods and 
services from other countries than it is selling, then it is also selling more assets 
to the other countries than it is buying.  Thus, “[w]hile the Current account deficit 
of recent years has received much media attention, there is little public awareness 
that this trade deficit is accompanied by a surplus in the Capital (now referred to 
as financial) account.”268  If a country runs a financial account surplus of $100 
billion, it will run a current account deficit of $100 billion to balance its 
payments.269 
In 2013, the U.S. had a merchandise trade deficit of $704 billion and a 
services trade surplus of $229 billion, resulting in a deficit of $475 billion, which 
when adjusted for other factors,270 the current account deficit was $379 billion, 
which was about 2.2% of 2013 GDP.  In that same year, U.S. consumers and 
corporations bought foreign assets worth $552 billion and foreigners bought $906 
billion of U.S. assets, resulting in a U.S. financial account surplus of 
approximately $354 billion.271  “In essence, for every dollar Americans handed 
over to foreigners in buying their goods (our imports), foreigners used eighty 
three [sic] cents to purchase U.S. goods (our exports), three cents (net) to pay us 
interest, and the remaining fourteen cents to purchase U.S. assets.”272  These 
assets include short-term financial assets such as stocks and bonds, direct 
investments through mergers and acquisitions, real assets in real property, and 
land.  
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As long as foreign investors continue to demand U.S. assets, the U.S. current 
account deficit is sustainable.  But even if foreign investors were to stop buying 
U.S. assets, the result can be a soft adjustment rather than a hard landing.  That is, 
if foreign investors no longer desire U.S. assets, the dollar will depreciate because 
fewer foreigners will need to buy U.S. dollars to buy U.S. assets.  Once the dollar 
depreciates, U.S. goods will be less expensive to foreigners.  This will make U.S. 
exports more competitive and U.S. exports will increase.  Imports will decrease 
and the trade deficit will be reduced. 
Viewed in a slightly different light, a U.S. current account deficit means in 
essence that the U.S. is selling assets to foreigners,273 whose purchases of U.S. 
assets allow the country to finance more investment than it could were it to rely 
on domestic savings alone.274  “The necessary balance between the current 
account and the capital account [now called the ‘financial account’] implies a 
direct connection between the trade balance on the one hand and the savings and 
investment balance on the other.”275  Foreign investment allows the U.S. to 
supplement its relatively low domestic savings to engage in more investment than 
it would have been able to if it had to rely on domestic savings alone.  When 
restrictions on international capital movement were lifted in the early 1980s, 
foreign capital flooded into the U.S.  For example, seeking higher rates of return, 
Japanese investors took part of their capital, resulting from a high national 
savings rate, from their domestic market and invested in assets in the U.S.276  The 
current account deficit for the U.S. peaked at six percent of GDP in 2006, 
prompting then Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke to remark that there was 
a “global savings glut,” caused by the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
by East Asian countries and the windfall to oil exporters from high oil prices.277  
This huge pool of foreign savings was used by foreigners to invest in the U.S., 
resulting in the large U.S. current account deficit.278 
The controversial U.S. trade deficit with China can also be viewed in the 
framework described above.  One reason for China’s trade surplus is that dollars 
it receives from exporting goods to the U.S. are not used to buy U.S. goods—
which would have rebalanced the current account and decreased the trade 
deficit—but rather, U.S. assets instead.  China purchased approximately $215 
billion in U.S. Treasury in 2013, swelling its foreign exchange reserves to $3.8 
trillion at the end of 2014.279  Because China’s central bank sold the yuan and 
bought dollars, it pushed up the value of the dollar and pushed down the value of 
the yuan.  The resulting devaluation of the yuan made Chinese exports less 
expensive to U.S. consumers, contributing to the U.S. trade deficit with China.  
Moreover, China pegged the value of its currency, the yuan, against the dollar at a 
low rate, leading to additional charges of currency manipulation and devaluation 
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to give its exports a competitive edge.280  It is certainly true that devaluing the 
yuan could be viewed as an implicit subsidy for Chinese exports, making them 
less expensive to U.S. consumers but also reducing U.S. exports to China.  Of 
course, another way to view this phenomenon is also to see it as “an implicit 
subsidy to the U.S. Treasury since it enables the government to borrow at a lower 
interest rate than it otherwise could.”281 
The balance of payments model is much more complex than simple exchange 
of money for finished products.  “Contrary to the impressions we may receive 
from gloom-and-doom news reporting, balance of payments accounting simply 
offers us a number—a reporting of the aggregated record of trade flows.”282  A 
deficit or a surplus in the current account which measures trade in goods and 
services or the financial account which measures financial flows or claims on 
assets is provocative because different groups within a country experience this 
deficit or surplus differently.  For example, a current account surplus—and a 
corresponding financial account deficit—is usually favored by those who are in 
the export sector.  The U.S. exported more to a particular country than it imported 
and is “holding their IOUs in the form of money or claims on their financial 
assets.”283  A current account deficit—and corresponding financial account 
surplus—means the U.S. is buying more goods and services from other countries 
and so these other countries “are holding IOUs in the form of American currency 
and other financial claims on assets.”284  It is important to understand that their 
willingness to do so is a reflection of their trust in the strength of the U.S. 
economy and its political system. 
If the U.S. blocked imports to reduce the trade deficit, “net capital inflows 
from abroad would necessarily have to fall”285 as foreigners would have fewer 
dollars to buy U.S. assets or U.S. Treasury bills—because they could not export 
as much to the U.S.   The dollar’s value would depreciate since there is less 
demand for it.  U.S. domestic investment would have to be financed by domestic 
savings.  To encourage domestic savings, U.S. interest rates would have to be 
raised which could slow economic growth and have adverse consequences for 
business investment and employment. 
The term “trade” is a broad term.  Zooming in and breaking it down into 
more specific components, for example, imports versus exports, the trade deficit, 
current account versus financial account, trade in goods, and trade in services, 
vertical integration and global supply chains, one can see that these components 
within the trading system are all interrelated.  The rhetoric against imports and the 
blame placed on foreign countries for U.S. job loss begins to lose its potency 
when an integrated perspective is adopted.  In addition, the changing nature of 
trade from monolocation production to multilocation production and hence the 
increasing reliance on global supply chains means that traditional gross trade 
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statistics about imports and exports are anachronistic and increasingly unreliable.  
There is, in addition, a blurring of lines between “us” versus “them” when 
products are “made in everywhere” and companies import intermediate 
components from their foreign affiliates plugged into their global supply chains.  
Blocking imports will end up hurting U.S. companies as well as U.S. workers, 
both in the production of goods and the provision of services, as discussed above. 
 
 
II. ZOOMING OUT: U.S. TRADE AND . . . 
 
 
Part I zoomed into the subcomponents within trade.  Part II aims to zoom out 
and look at trade and its relationship to other priority objectives of the U.S., such 
as protecting U.S. national security and ensuring the continued dominant status of 
the U.S. dollar.  In Part II, this Article will demonstrate first that there is indeed a 
link between trade and national security and that despite this acknowledged 
linkage, by the U.S. itself and by scholars in the field, the U.S. has too often 
allowed itself to be mired by anti-trade rhetoric and the politics of trade to the 
detriment of national security issues.  Second, Part II also claims that no country 
can have everything and can win in every arena, dominating every single 
economic sector from low-cost processing and assembly to downstream and 
upstream manufacturing and service as well as innovation and intellectual 
property.  The U.S. has incredible privilege flowing from a trading system that 
reinforces dollar supremacy.  To maintain this privilege, open trade is necessary.  
 
A. Trade and National Security 
 
In the post-September 11 era, “free trade, economic development, 
strengthening international law . . . [are] tools [that] have to be considered in the 
American portfolio of combating international terrorism.”286  It is said that the 
fight against terrorism has two sides, the demand side and the supply side.  
Whereas the supply side approach emphasizes security, the demand side 
emphasizes the underlying socio economic reasons behind this security threat.  
Free trade has an important role to play in this objective. 
The political and economic conditions of many countries in the Middle East 
are dire, characterized by “‘low growth, bad institutions of governance, and 
resistance to economic globalization.’”287  Foreign direct investment and 
international trade have been directed elsewhere, resulting in economies that are 
dominated by government management and ownership and ill-equipped to 
provide employment.288  Entrenched political elites operating in a system marked 
by corruption, clientelism and patronage oppose reform,289 seeing efforts to 
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change top-down management, for example, as a threat to their rule and survival.  
The huge divergence between the interests and incentives of rulers versus those of 
potential entrepreneurs is deemed one of the greatest impediments to reform, and 
against that backdrop, economic liberalization should loosen the control of 
political and economic insiders and consequently have a democratizing effect.290 
Economic development is more likely to occur when poor countries are 
plugged into rather than excluded from the international system: 
 
“[T]he increased involvement of the WTO, multinational 
corporations, international aid agencies, non governmental 
organizations, and foreign investors focusing on the 
development of non-oil industries through a process of market 
diversification and stabilization will improve the lives of those 
living in the Middle East,” thus rooting out all the causes of 
terrorism.291 
 
As Timur Kuran, a scholar on Islamic economies observed, 
 
The West in general and Europe in particular has made a major 
mistake over the past 15 years in sending signals that Islamic 
countries are not really part of their world.  The West has to do 
more to encourage those people—really the majority in many 
countries—who want to integrate, not turn their backs.292 
 
At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, the consensus was 
that states, multinational corporations, multilateral institutions, and civil society 
all have a role to play in facilitating aid, trade, and foreign direct investment, 
which were deemed the best avenues for ending poverty.293  However, as former 
Secretary of State Colin Powell remarked, “[o]fficial development aid alone is not 
enough.  Countries must also be able to attract the trade and investment that 
account for 80% of the money that is available for development.”294  A 
comprehensive multi-country World Bank study analyzing real and financial 
integration to poverty using indicators of trade and financial openness reveals that 
at low levels of globalization, poverty is not likely to be alleviated but that at a 
certain level of globalization and connectivity, the possibility for poverty 
reduction is markedly improved.295  The study shows that “[t]he real problem is 
the 50-odd very poor countries, which generate only 0.4 percent of world exports.  
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Their plight is due to too little globalization, not too much.”296 
In the case of investment, a 2002 study by the OECD found that despite 
potential drawbacks associated with foreign direct investment [FDI], the overall 
benefits are also clear:  “FDI triggers technology spillovers, assists human capital 
formation, contributes to international trade integration, helps create a more 
competitive business environment and enhances enterprise development.  All of 
these contribute to higher economic growth, which is the most potent tool for 
alleviating poverty in developing countries.”297  Because trade and investment 
also need a basic, reliable rule of law framework, “free trade and trade 
liberalization in general would be a catalyst for improving the deficient legal 
regulatory rules and systems in the Middle East and facilitate the legal integration 
of the WTO as well.”298 
Since September 11, trade and development have been elevated to a first-
order national security issue.  “[D]evelopment experts say that helping countries 
to manage their economies better is as important to challenging the terrorist 
vision as educational and political reform.”299  In 2002, the National Security 
Strategy of the U.S. emphasized the promotion of trade policies that “can help 
developing countries strengthen property rights, competition, the rule of law, 
investment, the spread of knowledge, open societies, the efficient allocation of 
resources, and regional integration—all leading to growth, opportunity, and 
confidence in developing countries.” 300  And in 2006, President George W. Bush 
called for global, regional, and bilateral trade initiatives 
 
to open markets and integrate the global economy through 
launching the Doha Development Agenda negotiations of the 
WTO.  The United States put forward bold and historic 
proposals to reform global agricultural trade, to eliminate farm 
export subsidies and reduce trade-distorting support programs, to 
eliminate all tariffs on consumer and industrial goods, and to 
open global services markets.301 
 
Emphasis has been on negotiating free trade agreements with countries all over 
the world, particularly the Middle East, and this strategy has continued into the 
administration of President Barack Obama.  For example, the National Security 
Strategy of the U.S. in 2015 continued to consist of reinforcing the basic 
international economic order, including the WTO’s trading regime precisely 
because the U.S. sees it as being crucial to promoting economic stability and 
growth.302 
Over and over, the mantra between trade and national security has been 
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repeated.  Right after September 11, 2001, Robert Zoellick, then U.S. Trade 
Representative wrote that in the face of terrorist attacks, “U.S. leadership in 
promoting the international economic and trading system is vital.  Trade is about 
more than economic efficiency.  It promotes the values at the heart of this 
protracted struggle.”303  Zoellick correctly reminded the public that Congress had 
used free trade “as a cure for the protectionism of the Great Depression and then 
to help Harry Truman revise a devastated world,”304 granting the President 
negotiating authority to enter into trade agreements to ensure open markets.  
Zoellick urged the U.S. to finalize its free trade agreement with Jordan,305 the first 
such agreement with the Arab world and with Vietnam, a former enemy that was 
pivoting away from Marxism and towards a market economy. 
Despite proclamations about the link between trade and national security, in 
reality, it has not always been easy to use trade to further national security 
objectives.  Take the example of Pakistan after September 11, which functions 
below as a case study into how priorities of different branches of government 
often conflict.  Even wartime exigencies could not pry loose the entrenched 
protectionist interests of the powerful textile and apparel industry.  Battle lines 
were drawn, pitting 
 
two critical American policy interests on a collision course.  On 
one side is the imperative to promote U.S. security by shoring up 
Pakistan and other allies in the Muslim world.  On the other side 
is the perennial pressure to support domestic manufacturers of 
textiles and other products that seek desperately to preserve 
trade constraints on those very same countries.306 
 
Despite Pakistan’s crucial role in the fight against terror and then Pakistani 
President Musharraf’s promise to help the U.S. locate Osama Bin Laden, 
President Bush’s concerted efforts to reciprocate by helping Pakistan’s exports to 
the U.S. were thwarted.  After September 11, private U.S. companies retreated 
from the volatile country.  Insurance companies increased their premiums for 
insuring shipments from Pakistan.307  U.S. apparel manufacturers like Tommy 
Hilfiger, American Eagle, and Perry Ellis cut down on business with Pakistani 
firms.308  Maintaining its textile and apparel industry employing sixty percent of 
the country’s industrial workers was a priority for Pakistan because its exports 
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totaled $5.8 billion, with $1.9 billion to the United States alone.309  Layoffs of 
tens of thousands of Pakistani textile workers “contribut[ed] to resentment of the 
United States among many young Pakistanis . . . while mullahs at radical local 
mosques . . . play[ed] on anger over job losses in their sermons.”310 
Alan Larson, the former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Economic, 
Business, and Agricultural Affairs, urged American importers to continue doing 
business with Pakistani suppliers.311  Wendy Chamberlin, the U.S. ambassador to 
Pakistan, announced, in a twist to the conventional “Buy American” slogan, that 
“[t]he patriotic thing to do if you’re American is to buy Pakistani products.”312  
The statement prompted a scathing retort from a spokesman of Representative 
Howard Coble, Republican from North Carolina:  “My boss said he’d like to have 
someone stick a sock in her mouth—an American-made sock at that.”313 
President Bush had the authority under the auspices of the Committee for the 
Implementation of Textile Agreements chaired by the Department of Commerce 
to modify textiles quotas.314  But tariffs required Congressional action, and 
President Bush prodded Kansas Senator Sam Brownback to sponsor legislation 
granting the president authority to lower Pakistani tariffs.  In the midst of the war 
in Afghanistan, it was widely assumed that Congress would not oppose the 
President’s initiatives to help lift Pakistan.  Indeed, under the first Bush 
Administration, the U.S. had increased textile quotas by fifty percent for Turkey 
“as a reward for its help in the 1991 Persian Gulf war.”315 
But the textile and apparel industry fought hard against the possibility of 
increased textile imports from Pakistan.  Under pressure from textile 
manufacturers in their states, then Senator Jesse Helms from North Carolina and 
Senator Fritz Hollings from South Carolina warned President Bush that “[t]hese 
Americans [textile workers] must not be made pawns in efforts to build an 
international coalition.”316 
A fierce battle ensued.  Developed countries had successfully exempted 
textile, apparel, and agriculture from the liberalization regime of the international 
trading system since the beginning of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1948, although WTO rules in 1995 had obligated that such 
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those exclusions be phased out.317  The U.S. saw U.S. reduction of tariffs and 
expansion of quotas as a needed boost for President Musharraf who was himself 
under attack by conservative and Islamist domestic critics for his support of the 
U.S.318  It was widely acknowledged that 
 
if President Bush wants to reach out to U.S. Muslim allies, there 
are few better things he can do than allow them greater access to 
the U.S. textile market.  Exporting textiles has long been a 
critical first step that poorer nations can take on the road to 
becoming full participants in the world economy.319 
 
In addition, the Bush administration “hoped trade concessions would help 
bolster the image of the U.S. in Pakistan—and in the Muslim world generally—
by demonstrating America’s desire to directly aid the workers of an Islamic 
country.”320  As the State Department’s Alan Larson stated, “As much as people 
in Pakistan clamored for and benefited from debt reduction and from increased 
aid, those are all things that are channeled through government, whereas trade 
benefits are more immediately felt by people.”321  
 The Pakistani government also hired lobbyists to promote its case.  In 2002, 
pressure on the U.S. increased when the EU announced it would allow Pakistani 
textile and apparel products to enter its market duty-free.322  The Bush 
Administration drafted a proposal that would have granted President Bush 
authority, renewable until 2004, to reduce or eliminate tariffs on textile or apparel 
imports from Pakistan if the President determined that Pakistan’s aid was critical 
and that as a result, Pakistan was suffering “substantial economic harm.”323 
In the end, Congressional opposition, not just to trade concessions for 
Pakistan but also to fast track,324 made the Administration scale back its efforts; 
even then, fast track passed the House by a mere 215-214 vote.325  Although 
President Musharraf asked for a trade concession package worth $1.4 billion, 
what Pakistan got was a package worth $476 million over three years with no 
tariff reduction and some quota concessions in areas that were almost never filled 
by Pakistan,326 such as woven blouses for women and girls, a category with only 
eighteen percent of its 2001 quota used.327 
Countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, India, and Morocco have all 
pressed the U.S. to end subsidies for farmers and cut tariffs on agricultural and 
apparel imports.  All issued a joint statement in 2002 expressing their deep 
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disappointment with how the U.S. has addressed their concerns thus far.328  U.S. 
inability to loosen its protectionist stance on textiles and apparel was evident even 
during the Doha Rounds of trade talk in December 2001, when it steadfastly 
resisted “efforts by India and others to make textiles the litmus test of the rich 
countries’ promise to launch a ‘development round’ of world trade talks that 
would bring more benefits of globalization to poorer countries.”329  Textiles has 
been at the center of the development debate “[s]ince Great Britain embarked on 
its industrial revolution . . . [because] this sector has been a crucial steppingstone 
for countries seeking to enter the modern industrialized age.”330  Yet it is 
precisely in this and other sectors in which poor countries have a comparative 
advantage and “would have the best chance to work their way out of poverty”331 
that developed countries have enacted the highest trade barriers.  Pride and 
prejudice again have tainted the trade debate in which rich countries continue to 
hector and berate poor ones for their audacity to leverage their only comparative 
advantage to trade with richer countries. 
Critics of the domestic textile and apparel industry have pointedly noted that 
even as all textile quotas would have had to be phased out by 2005 under WTO 
rules,332 the industry nonetheless managed to “squash proposals to grant trade 
benefits to Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—all key allies in the war on 
terrorism.  In other words, the protectionist lobby of a dying industry has quietly 
become arguably the most effective domestic opponent of American foreign 
policy.”333 
The relationship between trade and national security is widely touted, but 
zooming out and seeing this picture on an abstract level is one thing, while 
implementing trade measures to ensure the national security interests of the U.S. 
by advancing the economic development of key allies is another.  In 2002, faced 
with midterm Congressional elections and the possibility of losing Pennsylvania, 
a steel-manufacturing state, President Bush decided to impose steep tariffs on 
steel imports despite almost uniform international condemnation.  Thus, “[t]he 
president has decided that domestic political considerations take priority, even at 
a time when America continues to need international support in the war against 
terrorism,”334 especially from steel-producing countries such as Kazakhstan, a 
U.S. ally bordering Afghanistan.335 
Although national security interests and the war against terrorism have 
undoubtedly shown that U.S. “security depends on ensuring that other countries 
have a stake in the international system—which can only be done if the wealthy 
nations lower their trade barriers.”336  It is also true that in the end,  
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[t]rade policy presents hard tradeoffs between, on one hand, the 
losses faced by those whose jobs and companies are vulnerable 
to international competition and, on the other hand, the greater 
but more diffuse national interest in a more competitive and 
productive economy—and in promoting a more peaceful, 
prosperous and equitable world.337 
 
B. Trade and the U.S. Dollar 
 
Without doubt, the U.S. has a unique advantage because the dollar is the 
reserve currency of the world.  This privileged position of the dollar is not 
intrinsic.  It is a reflection of American economic and political hegemony.  This 
privilege solidified after World War II when the U.S. was the undisputed 
superpower that was not only the largest importer but also the primary source of 
trade credit and the leading source of foreign capital; thus imports and exports 
were invoiced in dollars.338  When central banks around the world needed to 
stabilize their currencies against the dollar, banks held dollars in reserve.339 
As this section demonstrates, the dollar will continue to be the international 
reserve currency only if the U.S. is willing to maintain an open international 
economic system.  Other countries can hold and accumulate dollars only if they 
can export freely in order to attain dollars.  Restrictions on their exports will only 
erode the dollar’s reserve status. 
A foreign reserve currency is currency held by central banks and other major 
financial institutions as a way to pay off international debt obligations and as a 
means to influence their domestic exchange rate.340  The U.S. has engineered 
through its political, economic and military power, the dollar’s supremacy 
because this unique status has given it great advantages. 
What does it mean for a currency to be the national currency of one country 
but also the reserve currency of the world?  Even international trade between or 
among countries that have no contact with the U.S. is likely to be denominated in 
dollars.  For example, if Thailand buys Indian goods, it is more likely than not 
that the payment will be in dollars and not in Thai baht.  With dollars, India could 
buy gold, oil, and other essential commodities on foreign markets.  Such 
commodities are all traded in dollars and as a result, all balance of payment 
differences are settled in dollars.341  But to pay India in dollars, Thailand would 
somehow have to acquire dollars in order to trade with India—usually by 
exporting.  The U.S., on the other hand, can buy anything from India and pay for 
it with dollars which it can print any time.  “[O]ther countries around the world 
cannot simply create money to settle their current account deficits. This is a 
privilege that accrues to [the] United States because of the dollar’s status as the 
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reserve currency.”342 
Once the dollar is the world’s reserve currency, every country needs dollars, 
which in turn reinforces demand for the dollar.  The dollar “has replaced gold as 
being the standard mechanism of exchange between currencies.”343  Indeed, 
eighty-five percent of all foreign exchange transactions are invoiced in dollars 
while half of international debt securities are also accounted for in dollars.344  The 
world’s central banks also hold close to $5 trillion of the bonds of the U.S. 
treasury and other quasi-governmental agencies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac,345 and because they continue to desire these dollar securities, they are 
willing to pay more to hold them.  Investors also like to invest their dollars in a 
safe dollar-denominated asset—the U.S. Treasury bond.  
Because demand for U.S. Treasury bond is high, the yields on those bonds 
are low, which in turn means the U.S. government can borrow money much 
cheaper from the world than it would be able to if the dollar were not a high-
demand reserve currency.  Approximately $500 billion of American currency 
circulates outside the U.S., which foreigners acquired, not because their 
governments printed the dollars, but because they had had to provide the U.S. 
with $500 billion of actual goods and services.346  “The American government has 
taken full advantage of the hegemony as they currently borrow to the tune of 
more than $2 billion daily.”347 
As this section demonstrates, the U.S. is well aware of the privilege of dollar 
dominance and has worked to ensure its continued use as top dog currency.  After 
World War II, the U.S. established an international monetary system that 
inaugurated the dollar’s supremacy.  Bretton Woods returned to the gold anchor 
that preceded World War I but with a unique twist.  The system was anchored to 
gold through the dollar at a fixed price of thirty-five dollars an ounce. Other 
currencies would fix their exchange rates to the dollar,348 which would be 
convertible to gold.   Thus, “[f]or foreign central banks and governments the 
dollar was as good as gold, since the United States stood ready to sell gold at a 
fixed price of $35 an ounce.”349  Although central banks could still accumulate 
gold, the gold supply was limited, which made a currency such as the dollar more 
appealing; moreover, the two main producers of gold were despised regimes—the 
Soviet Union and South Africa—and so accumulating gold would mean 
benefiting them.350 
After World War II, war-ravaged Europe and Japan needed to import food 
and materials for reconstruction.  Armaments factories had to be converted for 
peacetime production.  It was in the interest of the U.S. for Europe and Japan to 
export to earn dollars.  But before either country could export, capital equipment 
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war dollar shortage, the Marshall Plan for Europe and the Dodge Plan for Japan 
provided both with dollars so they could finance the purchases needed to 
jumpstart exports.  “In this sense the Marshall and Dodge Plans saved the Bretton 
Woods System and, by implication, the international role of the dollar.”351 
The dominance of the dollar meant great economic advantages for the 
country and the American people.  For example, U.S. consumers and investors 
could buy foreign goods and acquire foreign companies by using dollars that 
would be freely accepted.  At the same time, the U.S. government did not have to 
worry that the dollars accumulated by foreigners would be redeemed for gold, 
because foreigners were willing to accept and keep dollars—as dollars were 
presumably as good as gold.  “This ability to purchase foreign goods and 
companies using resources conjured out of thin air was the exorbitant privilege of 
which French Finance Minister Valery Giscard d’Estaing so vociferously 
complained.”352 
From 1946 to 1971, the system worked well.  Whenever there were 
disruptions in the system, the U.S. issued statements assuring the world of the 
stability of the dollar-anchored system.  President Johnson declared, “[t]he 
nations of the free world are united in their determination to keep the international 
monetary system strong . . . .”353  Furthermore, “[he] reaffirm[ed] unequivocally 
the commitment of the USA to buy and sell gold at the existing price of $35 an 
ounce.”354  
Pressure on the dollar began to build, however.  For example, when Germany 
and Japan, the two defeated World War II powers, denied military ambitions after 
the war, focused on growing their economies instead, it was not long before they 
became economic powerhouses and were able to accumulate—again, by 
exporting—all the dollars they needed.  If there are more foreign-held dollars than 
U.S. gold holdings, the threat to the system could be serious if foreign holders all 
demanded dollar to gold redemption.  French President Charles De Gaulle 
resented U.S. privileges “given the decline in the United States economic prowess 
and the rising price of gold at that time.”355  France, followed by Spain, converted 
much of their dollar reserves into gold.356  But the U.S. found help in Germany.  
With its persistent trade surpluses and large dollar holdings, it was important that 
Germany not exercise its right to convert dollars into gold.  Germany sought to 
preserve the security alliance with the U.S.  In fact, in a secret agreement, the 
President of the Deutsche Bundesbank assured the chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve that Germany would not exchange dollars for 
gold.357 
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Concern about the U.S., however, grew as the Vietnam War and President 
Johnson’s antipoverty Great Society program became increasingly costly.  
Although the U.S. “had built up a reservoir of economic strength at home and 
political goodwill abroad . . . [,] that reservoir now slowly began to be drained.”358  
Overseas dollar holders made relentless claims on the dollar and by March 1968, 
at $35 per ounce, gold was now valued too low.  The problem was “an excess of 
paper money in relation to gold [and] [t]his excess money was reflected in rising 
inflation in the United States, the United Kingdom and France.” 359  In 1971, 
President Richard Nixon declared that the U.S. would no longer convert dollars 
held by foreign central banks to gold or any other reserve assets and that it would 
no longer intervene in the market to maintain the par value of the dollar against 
gold.360  
Despite the collapse of gold convertibility, dollar dominance was nonetheless 
maintained361 because the U.S. was able to modify the system to prevent the 
dollar from becoming “simply paper money” or fiat currency.362  As 
Representative Ron Paul put it, 
 
a new system was devised which allowed the U.S. to operate the 
printing presses for the world reserve currency, with no 
restraints placed on it, not even a presence of gold convertibility, 
none whatsoever. . . . U.S. authorities struck an agreement with 
OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] to 
price oil in U.S. dollars exclusively for all worldwide 
transactions.  This gave the dollar a special place among world 
currencies, in essence backed the dollar with oil.  In return, the 
U.S. promised to protect the various oil-rich kingdoms in the 
Persian Gulf against threat or invasion or domestic coup.363 
 
Because of this deal, the dollar became the dominant currency in which 
energy transactions would be denominated,364 boosting its status as a reserve 
currency as governments all over needed to hold dollars in order to buy oil.  In 
this way, 
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[a]s emerging markets grow, they naturally accumulate foreign 
reserves as a form of self-insurance.  Central banks need the 
funds to intervene in the foreign exchange market so that they 
can prevent shocks to trade . . . . This capacity becomes more 
important as previously closed economies open up and when 
international markets are volatile . . . . It is only logical, in other 
words, for emerging markets to accumulate reserves.365 
 
And—this is key to the point made in this section of the Article—“to acquire 
dollar reserves, countries must run current account surpluses with the United 
States.”366  
Dollar supremacy is not guaranteed.  Critics have complained that the U.S. 
“has not been a worthy steward of an international currency . . . ”367 because of its 
heavy debt and chronic budget deficits.  Russia and China are also interested in 
challenging the dollar’s supremacy, proposing “the introduction of a new 
international reserve currency that is to be created to replace the dominant U.S. 
dollar . . . .”368  Both countries have entered into agreements to use their national 
currencies and bypass the dollar when engaged in bilateral trade.369  Even as the 
U.S. complained that China was manipulating its currency by devaluing it to 
make its exports cheaper, China too has had its own complaints.  In 2009, without 
mentioning the dollar, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China called for the 
establishment of a new international reserve currency:  “The desirable goal of 
reforming the international monetary system, therefore, is to create an 
international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations and is 
able to remain stable in the long run . . . .”370 
Given all the privileges that come from being able to print the world’s reserve 
currency, it is also important to understand the implications of this where trade is 
concerned.  If the dollar were to lose its status as the international reserve, the 
U.S. would lose the ability to do business in other countries in its own currency, 
the ability to borrow more cheaply than others countries, and the insurance policy 
that comes with the dollar’s safe-haven status.371  For the U.S. to keep its dollar 
privileges, it also needs to keep the international economic system open for trade.  
But there is a built-in tension.  Identified by the noted Belgian economist Robert 
Triffin, the Triffin Dilemma stated that if the U.S. did not run trade deficits, that 
is, if it was not willing to supply the trading system with an unlimited supply of 
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dollars—for countries that received dollars when they exported—trade would 
contract, growth would be stunted, and the contraction would damage the 
international economic system.372  On the other hand, if the U.S. continued to run 
trade deficits and hence provide an unlimited supply of dollars to the rest of the 
world, confidence in the U.S. ability to convert dollars to gold would diminish.373  
The point of this Article is not that the trade deficit is never a cause for concern.  
It is rather that discussion of trade must be based on facts and must be situated in 
a broader context, that is, in the wider international system that has maintained 
dollar supremacy and international peace and prosperity since World War II.  
Indeed, eliminating the trade deficit, as some have noted, “could mean giving 
up some of the key levers of power that allow the United States to get its way in 
international politics.  Getting rid of the trade deficit could very well make 






There are legitimate disagreements on trade policy, whether a particular 
measure is right or wrong, wealth-enhancing or wealth-reducing.  But the debate 
about trade has become increasingly strident, propelled by an entrenched view of 
“us” versus “them” that is itself fueled by nationalistic and nativist rhetoric at 
odds with the international economic order established since World War II.  
Today, trade has become the battlefield on which “economic nationalism, 
nativism, and identity politics”375 are being played out.   This Article has argued 
that policy differences aside, the gestalt of trade is one of openness.  The trade 
debate has been most heated in the area of job loss—how “we” have lost jobs to 
“them.”  I have shown that job loss due to technology and automation has 
scarcely entered the national consciousness and has scarcely garnered 
condemnation, much less outrage.  Trade with others, especially the non-white 
others outside the U.S. nationhood, has become the target of fear and anxieties 
instead.  
This Article does not claim that criticism of trade or of globalization 
generally is wrong or off-limits.  Indeed there is a wealth of scholarship that 
addresses the benefits as well as problems of international trade.  But the trade 
debate must be grounded on clear-eyed facts, not pride and prejudice.  By 
focusing trade inward or zooming in, this Article shows that trade has been 
transformed by global supply chains.  Boundaries are thus blurred.  Production is 
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characterized by multilocation and products are “made in the world,” rarely in 
one country.  But trade statistics are still anachronistically founded on an old-
world view of monolocation at odds with facts on the ground.  When imports and 
exports figures are distorted because they exclude a value-added perspective that 
would accurately reveal the many “contacts” a product has with the countries 
embedded in the global supply chain, political debate about trade and trade 
deficits is misshapen.  Exaggerating these figures to show that the U.S. is 
“losing,” and being “ripped off” by other countries allows opportunistic critics to 
further fuel their agenda of economic nationalism.  The U.S. continues to 
dominate the upstream segments of global production, in both upstream 
manufacturing and in the service component of trade. U.S. imports contain many 
components the U.S. had itself exported.  Manufacturing and services are 
becoming more intertwined and less blurred.  Protectionism in manufacturing will 
harm the export sector and growing services sector of the U.S. economy. 
Boundaries are blurred in other ways as well.  Imports and exports are not 
wholly separate and distinct components of trade but are two sides of the same 
coin.  In this vein, it is also important to understand that the trade deficit should 
be viewed in a broader context and linked with investment.  Take the trade deficit 
with China as an example.  If China acquired $366 billion of goods from the U.S. 
and the U.S. acquired $482 billion of goods made in China, there is a $366 billion 
trade deficit with China—although some economists have argued that from a 
different perspective, “China ‘lost’ a net amount of $366 billion of goods that 
ended up being consumed and enjoyed by Americans.”376  Regardless, the main 
point is that the China paid for those goods with U.S. dollars.  China took in “a 
net amount of $366 billion worth of U.S. currency, the exact amount of the trade 
deficit.”377  As this Article has demonstrated, this dollar amount returned to the 
U.S. and the capital inflow is used to purchase U.S. assets like stocks and bonds, 
real estate, U.S. Treasury securities and also as direct investment in the U.S. 
economy. 
Boundaries are indeed blurred.  Merchandise and financial assets are linked.  
The trade deficit is offset by a corresponding financial surplus and foreign 
investment surplus. Thus there is no net loss.  Indeed, 
 
to constantly lament America's trade deficit is to lament the fact 
that foreigners are eagerly investing hundreds of billions of 
dollars in America every year.  We shouldn’t think of trade 
deficits as losing to countries such as China, but rather as 
“inflows of foreign investment capital that strengthen America’s 
economy.”378 
 
Of course, economic nationalists have lamented about foreign “takeovers” when 
foreigners, particularly non-Europeans, buy up American assets,379 showing the 
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face of nativism, not economic rationalism. 
Boundaries are blurred when one takes trade and zoom out as well, into two 
related areas—national security and finances.  Trade has been viewed as an 
integral part of promoting peace among nations since the post-World War II era.  
Indeed, the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 went to the EU, prompting some to joke 
that the “Nobel committee congratulates Germany on over 70 years without 
invading France.”380  But it is no joking matter that in fact, Germany has not 
invaded France in seventy years or that the reduction of trade barriers within EU 
countries has made poorer countries within the continent richer, and “that stopped 
war.”381  The beginnings of the EU emerged from the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community following “a hard-headed proposal by 
Robert Schuman, the then French foreign minister, to ensure that war could never 
be fought again by France and Germany by pooling the two resources vital to 
wage war—coal and steel.”382  Schuman’s famous declaration noted:  “This 
merging of our interests in coal and steel production and our joint action will 
make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not only 
unthinkable but materially impossible.”383  Thus, the idea that trade, connectivity, 
and openness is conducive to peace is not new. But in the U.S. after September 
11, this connection was elevated to a first-order national security level.  
The boundary between trade and the supremacy of the dollar is also blurred.  
The status of the dollar as an international reserve currency is dependent on an 
international economic system that removes barriers, facilitates trade, and allows 
foreigners who cannot print dollars to accumulate dollars, which in turn cements 
dollar supremacy.  In fact, from a nationalist standpoint, free trade and dollar 
supremacy have been great for the U.S.  It is, at the very least, ironic that trade is 
under attack in the U.S. on nationalist grounds.  
Although it is wholly understandable that people in certain industries and 
sectors who have lost because of trade will be anxious, the solution is not to 
demonize trade.  It is, rather, to pursue policies that will harness the best elements 
of globalization and moderate its worst ones via increased social safety nets, 
outright cash payments, or trade adjustment assistance or job retraining.   
 As Oscar Wilde once said, “patriotism is the vice of nations.”384  Workers, 
even those outside one’s nation—even those from poor, non-European 
countries—should be allowed to trade openly and freely with others—this is in 
fact, the basis of international trade if it were untainted by populist zeitgeist of 
racialized identity politics and economic nationalism. 
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